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Abstract
Political processes in most democracies are characterized by the existence of hierarchies from
policy-implementing agency staff to executive appointees at the head of the agency to cabinet
members to chiefs of government to voters. Three attributes characterize these hierarchies:
(1) uninformed principal; (2) costly information acquisition by the subordinate overseers; and
(3) delegated principal-agent relationship to the subordinate overseers. We study how effective
such hierarchies are at solving the entailed principal-agent relationships and show that principals
can, indeed, improve the agent’s performance by hiring intermediate overseers. The effectiveness
of a hierarchy significantly depends on its length, however. We show that there always exist
conditions under which adding a marginal overseer to a hierarchy of a given length increases the
effort level of the agent, and, in fact, can do so in a way that is cost-effective for the principal.
Surprisingly, the effectiveness of the hierarchy can decrease with the increase in the information
available to the overseers.
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1 Introduction
Political processes at all government levels in most democracies are characterized by the existence of
hierarchies from policy-implementing agency staff to executive appointees at the head of the agency
to cabinet members or elected administrators to heads of regional governments. Two features of
such hierarchies set them apart from most principal-agent relationships studied in political economy.
The first is their length, which often goes far beyond the classic binary principal-agent relationship.
The second is the fact that voters, as principals of such hierarchies, typically have no special
expertise in the particular area of a given agency’s policy domain, and neither the ability nor the
incentives to acquire it.
How effective are such hierarchies at solving the entailed principal-agent relationships? Is there
a satisfactory answer to the question of “who will oversee the overseer?” in the context of such
chains of principal-agent relationships? When are principals (voters) better off delegating the
oversight, including the creation and enforcement of incentives for their agents, to subordinate
overseers, and, in contrast, when are they better off relying on the second-bests (e.g., directly
electing heads of state agencies, as they do in California and other states)? While these questions
and the corresponding institutional settings are clearly important and related to considerable body
of work in political economy (see the discussion below), the conjunction of attributes most relevant
to them: (1) uninformed principal; (2) costly information acquisition by the subordinate overseers;
and (3) delegated principal-agent relationship to the subordinate overseers appears to have eluded
systematic analysis.
A key intuition that underlies our analysis is that a sequence of subordinate overseers can
offer the principal a way of implementing effective incentives for oversight that substitutes for
the precise information about the agent’s choice that the principal does not have. At the core
of our main results is the interaction between the credibility of those incentives and the direct
and indirect information about the agent’s choices. We show that principals can improve the agent
performance by hiring intermediate supervisors, but when and how this welfare gain occurs depends
on a number of factors. To induce the agent to invest more into effort, the overseers must be willing
to invest into oversight — which they are more likely to do when predicting outcome without the
knowledge of the agent’s effort is harder — and the overseers must be able to commit themselves
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to retention choices that reward effort by their subordinates. We show that the principal with a
single intermediate supervisor has limited abilities to create the incentives that lead to a high effort
by the agent even where equilibria with high effort exist in the absence of intermediate supervisors.
On the other hand, hiring two or more intermediate supervisors can make the principal strictly
better off relative to no intermediate oversight because the addition of the second supervisor makes
possible the equilibrium in which the commitment to reward and punish the agent based on his
choices is more credible. Adding further overseers can now increase the probability of investment
into oversight by their subordinates, which can further increase the agent’s choice — but only so
long as the highest ranking overseer remains sufficiently uncertain about the outcome to invest into
oversight himself. More generally, we provide conditions under which adding marginal overseers to
an oversight chain of a given length not only improves the agent performance, but also lowers the
cost to the principal of the oversight hierarchy itself. We also show that another factor affecting the
value of intermediate oversight is the exogenous informational environment: holding fixed the level
of principal’s informedness, gains from introducing intermediate oversight decrease in the exogenous
information about the action and its consequences available to overseers. Observing the success or
failure consequences of agent’s actions makes intermediate oversight counterproductive, while the
increase in the likelihood of observing those actions and the state on which they are contingent
without oversight effort can decrease the agent’s action.
In the next section to follow, we briefly discuss the previous work on oversight in administrative
hierarchies. Section 3 provides a formal description of our model. Section 4 presents some baseline
results. Section 5 studies the equilibria of our main model. Section 6 turns to the question of
welfare comparisons, developing results on the welfare effects of adding marginal overseers, optimal
distribution of compensation to overseers, and the value of exogenous information. Section 7
shows that the equilibria analyzed in Section 5 are robust to the possibility of stochastic action
outcome revelation to the overseers. Section 8 shows that hiring a vertical oversight hierarchy can
be attractive for the principal compared to contracting with outside auditors. Section 9, then,
concludes with a brief discussion of the relationship between our results and some of the previous
findings.
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2 Previous Work on Oversight in Hierarchies
An extensive literature in industrial organization has studied output-contingent contracts in the
context of the classic binary principal-agent relationship.
A number of papers, starting with Williamson (1967) have examined incentives and oversight
in hierarchies. The influential papers that have focused on moral hazard include Calvo and Wellisz
(1978) and Qian (1994). These models focus on the environment in which the set of individuals
at a given level of hierarchy can be large (it is a singleton in our model) and formalize the notion
of the “loss of control” that results from increasing the set of supervised subordinates for a given
supervisor. In these models, the loss of control provides a limit on the efficiency of supervision. We
depart from this literature in two crucial ways: we focus on the problem of creating the incentives
for costly strategic supervision, which these papers do not study, and we abstract away from the
problem of the loss of control by focusing on the hierarchies with a single decision-maker/task at
each level.1
Strausz (1997) studies the problem of creating such incentives when, as in our model, the prin-
cipal cannot verify the supervisor’s monitoring, but, unlike in our model, assumes the environment
in which the intermediate supervisor discovers hard information that can be costlessly shared with
the principal, whose contract design can condition on what the supervisor reveals to him. Rahman
(2013) studies costly private monitoring but outside the framework of the output-contingent con-
tracts, which we assume are faced by the principal; the contracts he analyzes are also unavailable
in our environment.
A series of papers (e.g. Tirole, 1986; Laffont and Tirole, 1991; Faure-Grimaud, Laffont and
Martimort, 2003) examines the effect of principals’ hiring an independent auditor who can inform
him about the agent’s choices. The auditor performs only auditing functions – i.e., obtaining
information and informing the principal – and does not have the executive ability to reward or
1Recent empirical work in political economy analyzes the patterns of task bundling and unbundling among the
elected officials (Berry and Gersen, 2008), emphasizing, inter alia, considerations of the loss of control. In practice,
task bundling leads to the creation of oversight hierarchies under the elected official and tasks unbundling to the
shortening or the elimination of such hierarchies. Our analysis in the present paper may be thought of isolating the
effects of hierarchy lengths associated with these different concentrations of tasks, while holding fixed the number of
tasks or complexity of responsibility.
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punish the agent that intermediate overseers in the hierarchies we analyze do. A key question
in those models is when the principal benefits from hiring auditors given the possibility of their
collusion with the agents. In the present paper, we abstract away from the possibility of collusion,
but study a comparison of principal’s welfare with vertical oversight hierarchies and with outside
auditors.2
Apart from the differences discussed above, another key factor that distinguishes our model
is the focus on binary contracts: decisions to retain or fire the agents. Such contracts are an
important characteristic of many political agency settings, in which principals do not have access
to a large and flexible set of contract terms and are often constrained to use blunt instruments,
such as retaining or replacing agents, allocating or not allocating a set budget, or reassigning an
agent to a less desirable job. Modeling the Principal’s problem as the decision about whether to
retain or fire the Agent captures this feature of the political environment in a simple way.
The theoretical work on the political economy of accountability originates with the seminal
papers by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986). The typical framework analyzed in those models and
the large literature that followed (recent examples include Alt, Bueno de Mesquita and Rose (2011);
Ashworth, de Mesquita and Friedenberg (2013); others) is that of a binary relationship between a
principal and an agent under distinct informational and institutional circumstances. Further, the
principal’s choice in these models typically turns on the incentives associated with a single action
by a subordinate agent.3 While the present model is motivated by the concerns with accountability
that are at the center of this literature, we depart from it in analyzing the effects on the quality of
agent’s accountability of a sequence of delegated principal-agent relationships among intermediate
overseers – thus considerably enlarging the set of decisions that principal’s choice seeks to motivate.
Finally, and particularly relevant to our analysis empirically, there is a large literature on
delegation and accountability in studies of comparative politics. An influential line of argumentation
in that work identifies parliamentary democracies with a “chain of delegation” running from the
2In the interests of comparability to the vertical oversight game, we further depart from the previous models of
auditing in assuming that auditors must also incur a cost to become informed.
3Some exceptions are Gordon and Hafer (2007), who study the interaction between two agents subordinate to the
voters, the legislature directly elected by them, for which it then sets policy; Bueno de Mesquita and Landa (2013),
who analyze a model with a sequence of choices by the agent between principal’s retention choices; and Le Bihan
(2014), who analyzes a model with the agent making separate choices with respect to different policy dimensions.
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voters at the top of the hierarchy to the elected legislatures to ministerial cabinets to lower-level
oversight relationships within ministries and other government agencies so that “at each link a
single principal delegates to one and only one agent, or to several non-competing ones, and in
which each agent is accountable to one and only one principal” (Strøm (2003); see also Strøm,
Mu¨ller and Bergman (2006); Strøm, Mu¨ller and Smith (2010)). Strøm (2000) argues, further,
that in parliamentary democracies, selection problems are resolved within political parties, which
are somewhat orthogonal to these chains, whereas moral hazard problems are more central to the
relationships between the occupants of the different links in the chains. In focusing on moral
hazard problems within such chains of delegation, the games we analyze share key features with
this account of parliamentary democracies.
3 Primitives
We consider games between the Agent (A), a sequence of Overseers Oi ∈ {O1, O2, ..., On} and the
Principal (P ). Unless indicated otherwise, the sequence of play is as follows:
(i) Nature chooses a state of the world ω ∈ {ωL, ωH} with 0 < ωL < ωH < 1, and Pr(ω = ωH) :=
pi. In what follows, we refer to ω as “the state.”
(ii) After observing the state, A takes an action a ∈ {a, a} with 0 ≤ a < a ≤ 1. With probability
aω, the action results in policy success (s), while with probability 1− aω, it results in failure
(f). In some of the games we consider below the outcome is observed immediately after a is
chosen, while in others it is observed after all the Overseers have made their choices.
(iii) Overseer 1’s choices:
(a) O1 chooses whether to invest in a costly search to learn a and ω. We denote the decision
of O1 to investigate A, I1 = 1 and the decision not to investigate I1 = 0.
(b) If O1 invests, Nature reveals (a, ω) to O1 with probability e1 and reveals nothing with
probability (1− e1). If O1 does not invest, he does not learn (a, ω).
(c) Based on the information revealed under (b), O1 chooses an action R ∈ {F,K} with F
describing the case where O1 fires A and K the case where he retains A.
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(iv) Each Overseer Oi in sequence (O2, ..., On), starting with Overseer 2, makes her choices:
(a) After observing the retention decisions of Overseers Oj<i, Oi chooses whether to invest
into a costly search to learn a, and ω. The decision to investigate upon observing a sequence
of retention decision (ROi−2 , . . . , RO1 , R) is denoted by Ii(R
Oi−2 , . . . , RO1 , R) ∈ {0, 1}.
(b) If Oi invests, Nature reveals (a, ω) to Oi with positive probability. This probability
depends on whether Oi−1 observed (a, ω). If Oi−1 observed (a, ω), Oi learns (a, ω) with prob-
ability ei. If, however, Oi−1 did not observe (a, ω), then Oi learns (a, ω) with probability
e∅i < ei.
(c) Based on the information revealed under (b), Oi chooses an action R
Oi−1 ∈ {FOi−1 ,KOi−1}
with FOi−1 describing the case where Oi fires Oi−1 and KOi−1 the case where he retains Oi−1.
(v) The policy outcome is realized. P observes the outcome and the retention decisions of all
Overseers, but not the level of effort exerted by the Agent, the state of the world, and whether
the Overseers investigated or not. Based on his observations, P decides whether to retain On.
(vi) Utilities are realized.
The players’ preferences are given as follows.
Let WA > 0 be the value to A of being retained in office and 0 be the value of A’s outside
option.
Further, regardless of whether she is retained, A receives k(1 − a) with k ∈ (0, 1).4 Thus, A’s
utility is IWA + k(1− a), where I = 1 if A is retained and 0 otherwise.
Let WOi > 0 be the value to Oi of being retained and 0 be the value of her outside option.
Further, if Oi chooses to invest in a search, Oi incurs a cost ci > 0. Thus, Oi’s utility is IWOi−Iici,
where I = 1 if Oi is retained and 0 otherwise.
P receives B in case of success (s) and 0 otherwise.
Throughout, our solution concept is pure strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
Before proceeding with the analysis, we comment on some noteworthy features of the oversight
hierarchy we model. First, we assume a certain asymmetry in the information that is available to
4This functional form is used for simplicity of exposition. We would get similar results with any concave function
of (1− a).
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actors. In particular, while the Principal and the second Overseer observe at no cost the retention
decision of the first Overseer, they do not automatically observe the effort level of the Agent, nor the
decision of Overseer 1 to investigate or not. This reflects the fact that retention decisions are in the
public record. Second, we assume that the Principal cannot himself invest into becoming informed
about the actual effort level of the Agent nor about the decisions of Overseers to investigate or
not. If we think of the Principal as representing the voters, this restriction may be thought of as
reflecting the limited opportunities for acquiring expertise available to the voters and their limited
incentives of doing so, given the low likelihood of being pivotal. Finally, the hierarchies we envision
as most empirically relevant to our analysis include, but not are limited to, the structures found
in many parliamentary democracies: from the voters at the top of the hierarchy to the elected
legislatures to ministerial cabinets to lower-level oversight relationships within ministries and other
government agencies.
4 Baseline Models
We begin with baseline results, characterizing the equilibria of two models that are variations
on the model described above: (1) the environment without intermediate Overseers and (2) the
environment where Overseers observe the policy outcome before deciding whether to investigate or
not. The primary value of these baseline results is to shed light on features of the main model,
though aspects of these results may be of independent interest as well.
4.1 Classical Moral Hazard: No Overseers
Our first result describes the equilibrium in what is a classic principal-agent moral hazard environ-
ment.
Lemma 4.1 Suppose that there are no Overseers. Then, in equilibrium, the Agent chooses
aˆ(ω) =
 a if WA ≥ k/ωa otherwise.
The Principal retains the Agent if and only if the outcome is success.
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Proof. Suppose the Principal keeps the Agent with probability rP (K|s) ∈ {0, 1} when the outcome
is success and keeps the Agent with probability rP (K|f) ∈ {0, 1} when the outcome is failure.
Then, the utility of the Agent from exerting effort a is UA(a, rP ) = k(1−a) +aωrP (K|s)WA+ (1−
aω)rP (K|f)WA. Hence, if aωrP (K|s)WA + (1−aω)rP (K|f)WA ≥ k(a−a) +aωrP (K|s)WA + (1−
aω)rP (K|f)WA, the Agent wants to exert level of effort a, whereas, otherwise, the Agent wants to
exert effort level a. Obviously, the equilibrium level of effort by the Agent is then maximized by
letting rP (K|s) = 1 and rP (K|f) = 0.
Hence, in equilibrium, 1) if WA ≥ k/ωL the Agent will choose to exert high effort in both states
of the world, i.e. aˆ(ω) = a for all ω, 2) if k/ωL > WA ≥ k/ωH , the Agent will choose to exert high
effort in the high state and low effort in the low state, i.e. aˆ(ωH) = a, and aˆ(ωL) = a, and 3) if
WA < k/ωH , the Agent will choose to exert low effort in both states of the world, i.e. aˆ(ω) = a
for all ω. If we think about the Principal as seeking to choose an optimal hierarchical oversight
structure, then this result may be seen as establishing the lower bound on the Principals welfare: if
a given hierarchy yields welfare below this bound, the Principal is better off not delegating oversight
and simply implementing an outcome-based retention rule for the Agent.
4.2 Policy Outcome is Realized Before Overseers Make Their Choices
Our next result concerns the environment in which the Overseers observe the outcome before
making their choices. As the Proposition below shows, this is a particularly unattractive world
for the Principal: he cannot induce effort on the part of any members of the hierarchy above the
Agent.
Proposition 4.1 Suppose there are n Overseers, n = 1, 2, and the Overseers observe the outcome
before making their retention decision. Then there exists no equilibrium in which any of the Over-
seers investigates. The equilibrium level of the Agent’s effort is as described in Lemma 4.1. In
equilibrium, the Principal and the Overseers each choose to retain if and only if the outcome is
success.
Proof. WLOG suppose that every Overseer up to On−1 has kept the actor who is below him in
the hierarchy, i.e. the sequence of retention decision is (KOn−1,K). If
rP (K
On |s,KOn−1 ,KOn−2 , . . . ,KO1 ,K) > rP (KOn |s, FOn−1 ,KOn−2 , . . . ,KO1 ,K),
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then On strictly prefers to keep On−1 upon observing (s,KOn−2 , . . . ,KO1 ,K) independently of (a, ω)
and thus In(s,K
On−2 , . . . ,KO1 ,K) = 0. By the same argument, In(s,K
On−2 , . . . ,KO1 ,K) = 0 if
rP (K
On |s,KOn−1 ,KOn−2 , . . . ,KO1 ,K) ≤ rP (KOn |s, FOn−1 ,KOn−2 , . . . ,KO1 ,K). In other words,
if On observes the outcome, he never exerts any effort. But then, as On observes the policy outcome
before before making his retention decision and never exerts any effort, his retention decision is
based on the same information as the retention decision of the Principal. Repeating the argument
for On we can thus show that On−1 never exerts any effort if On−1 observes the policy outcome
before deciding whether to retain On−2. By induction, it is thus the case that none of the Overseers
exerts any effort if the Overseers observe the policy outcome before making their retention decisions.
Now suppose, the Principal keeps On if, and only if, the policy outcome is success. Then, On is
indifferent between keeping and firing On−1 when there is policy success and when there is policy
failure and it is thus a best-response for On to keep On−1 if, and only if, there is policy success.
The same is true in general for any Overseer Oi. In particular, if any Overseer keeps if, and only
if, there is success, it is also a best-response for O1 to keep A if, and only, if there is success.
But then, O1 is using the same retention rule as P is using in Lemma 4.1, which implies that the
equilibrium level of the Agent’s effort is as described in Lemma 4.1. Finally, it is not possible for
the Principal to improve upon this equilibrium, as any improvement would have to come from the
fact that Overseers are better informed than the Principal, which we established is never the case
in this game.
The Overseers cannot do better because by the time of their choices, the outcome is realized, and
if the Principal or O2 chooses to condition her retention rule on a retention action, the immediate
subordinate will simply choose a retention action that maximizes her probability of retention –
without investing into effort. No Overseer will want to invest into effort because by the time of
their choice, the outcome is already determined, and they know that the immediate superior will
not condition their retention rule on the subordinate’s effort either. O1’s equilibrium rule of retain
if and only if success will induce the Agent to choose an equilibrium level of effort that is equal to
what it would be in the environment with no Overseers. Note that if O2 chooses to condition O1’s
retention on O1’s own retention action with respect to A in a way that is different from retain if
and only if success, then this will induce O1 to choose a retention rule for the Agent that cannot
increase, but can decrease, the Agent’s effort.
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If we interpret this result from the standpoint of optimal design of oversight hierarchy, holding
the Principal as a residual claimant on the Overseers’ rewards of office, then the comparison of this
environment and the one without the Overseers is clearly in favor of no Overseers. In both cases,
the Principal has to pay the Agent a wage of at least k/ωL to induce the Agent to choose a in both
states of the world, and a wage of at least k/ωH to induce effort in the high state. However, now
the Principal also has to pay a Wage to the Overseers. Both Lemma 4.1 and this interpretation
are, perhaps, somewhat surprising, since in principal-agent settings, more information about the
outcome, and, further, having that information available before making choices, is typically associ-
ated with better outcomes. Here, because of the nature of the principal-agent relationship within a
hierarchy, that information clearly does not help, and, moreover, as the results below indicate, can
hurt relative to what the Principal can do with hierarchical oversight when the outcome is realized
after the Overseers’ actions.
5 Costly Oversight
5.1 Single Overseer
In contrast to the costless oversight setting, the addition of a single Overseer restricts the ability
of the Principal to induce the Agent to exert high effort and is thus generally unattractive when
oversight is costly. Indeed, as we explain in more detail below, under costly oversight, there is no
equilibrium in which the Agent chooses to exert high effort in both states of the world, and there
exists a range of parameter values (a, ω) for which, in any equilibrium, the Agent chooses low effort
in both states of the world. To understand why this is the case, we first identify two necessary
conditions to sustain an equilibrium in which the Agent chooses high effort in some state of the
world ω :
Lemma 5.1 The Agent chooses to exert high effort a in state of the world ω only if
1. Overseer O1 investigates, and
2. Overseer O1 retains the Agent upon observing (a, ω) and fires him upon observing (a, ω).
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The utility to the Agent of choosing high effort in some state of the world ω is
UA(a|ω) = k(1− a) + I1e1rO1(K|a, ω)WA + (1− I1e1)rO1(K|∅)WA,
while the utility of choosing low effort is
UA(a|ω) = k(1− a) + I1e1rO1(K|a, ω)WA + (1− I1e1)rO1(K|∅)WA.
As effort is costly to the Agent, (k(1− a) < k(1− a)), the Agent will choose to exert high effort
only if the probability of being retained is higher when exerting high effort than when exerting
low effort. This has the straightforward implication that the Overseer must retain the Agent upon
observing high effort and dismiss the Agent when observing low effort, i.e. rO1(K|a, ω) = 1 > 0 =
rO1(K|a, ω). But it also implies that the Overseer needs to investigate to sustain high effort by the
Agent. Indeed, if the Overseer O1 does not investigate, i.e. I1 = 0, then the retention probability
of the Agent will be the same when he exerts high effort as when he exerts low effort, namely
rO1(K|∅). But then there is no upside for the Agent of exerting high effort.
Given a hierarchy with a single Overseer, the ability of the Principal to induce the Agent to
exert high effort thus depends on whether the Principal can retain the Overseer in such a way that
the Overseer is induced (1) to investigate and (2) to commit to the Agent that he will retain him for
high effort and dismiss him for low effort. As the following Lemma reveals, however, any retention
rule that the Principal may use to incentivize the Overseer to investigate implies a restriction on the
willingness of the Overseer to retain the Agent. With a single Overseer, there is thus a fundamental
tension between satisfying the first necessary condition for high effort, namely that the Overseer
O1 investigates, and the second necessary condition, namely that the Overseer rewards high effort
and punishes low effort.
Lemma 5.2 The Overseer only investigates if he strictly prefers to keep the Agent upon observing
(aˆ(ω), ω) and strictly prefers to fire the Agent upon observing (aˆ(ω′), ω′) with ω 6= ω′.
Proof. see Appendix.
The intuition behind this Lemma is as follows. As the effort level of the Agent has already
been determined when the Overseer is deciding whether to investigate, the Overseer can only be
investigating in order to increase his probability of retention. Suppose now the statement in Lemma
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5.2 does not hold. Then, the Overseer weakly prefers to keep (or to fire) the Agent in all instances
and the Overseer cannot improve his probability of retention by becoming informed about the state
of the world and the level of effort exerted by the Agent.
The fundamental tension revealed by Lemma 5.2 severely diminishes the ability of the Principal
to incentivize the Agent to exert high effort given a hierarchy with a single Overseer. Indeed, the
Principal is never able to induce the Agent to exert high effort in both states of the world.
Proposition 5.1 Suppose there is a single Overseer who has to pay c1 > 0 to observe a, and ω.
Then, there do not exist WA and WO1 such that in equilibrium the Agent chooses aˆ(ω) = a for all
ω.
Proof. Given in the text.
The argument behind proposition 5.1 goes as follows. Suppose, by contradiction, that there
exists an equilibrium in which the Agent chooses high effort in both states of the world, i.e. aˆ(ω) = a
for all ω. Then, by Lemma 5.1, it must be the case, in such an equilibrium, that the Overseer O1
investigates. Moreover, by Lemma 5.2, for the Overseer to investigate it must then be the case that
he strictly prefers to keep the Agent upon observing (a, ω) and strictly prefers to fire the Agent
upon observing (a, ω′) with ω 6= ω′. However, if the Overseer strictly prefers to fire the Agent upon
observing that the Agent exerted high effort in state of the world ω′, i.e. upon observing (a, ω′),
then, by Lemma 5.1, it is not a best-response for the Agent to choose aˆ(ω′) = a.
The implication of this result is clear yet striking. When there is a single Overseer and the
outcome is realized after the Overseer makes his retention decision, then no matter how high the
wages are that the Principal pays to the Agent and the Overseer, it will never be the case that the
Agent chooses to exert high effort in both states of the world.
Lemma 5.2 has two further important implications which distinguish the costless oversight
setting from the costly one. First, Lemma 5.2 implies a restriction on the retention rules that can
be used by the Principal, in any equilibrium in which the Agent is exerting high effort in some
state of the world:
Corollary 5.1 O1 does not investigate unless either
1. rP (K
O1 |s,K) = 1, rP (KO1 |s, F ) = 0, rP (KO1 |f,K) = 0, and rP (KO1 |f, F ) = 1, or
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2. rP (K
O1 |s,K) = 0, rP (KO1 |s, F ) = 1, rP (KO1 |f,K) = 1, and rP (KO1 |f, F ) = 0.
Proof. see Appendix.
The most striking implication of this last result is that the Principal must condition his retention
decision of the Overseer on the decision by the Overseer to keep or fire the Agent in order for an
equilibrium to exist in which the Agent is willing to exert high effort. Otherwise the Overseer
is indifferent between keeping and firing the Agent and thus has no incentive to invest in costly
information acquisition. But then the Agent cannot be incentivized to exert effort. This necessary
condition for a high effort equilibrium to exist in the costly oversight hierarchy is particularly
interesting when compared to the case where the Overseer costlessly observes the state of the world
and the level of effort exerted by the Agent. There, we established that the Principal could only
reduce the level of effort exerted by the Agent by conditioning on the retention decision used by
the Overseers. When there is even the slightest cost of investigating for the Overseers, precisely
the opposite is true.
Second, Lemma 5.2, jointly with Corollary 5.1, has important implications for the level of effort
of the Agent that can be achieved. Indeed, as our next result shows, there is a large range of values
of (a, ω) for which no equilibrium exists in which the Agent chooses to exert high effort in any of
the states of the world.
Proposition 5.2 Suppose there is a single Overseer who has to pay c1 > 0 to observe a, and ω.
If aωH ≤ 1/2, or aω ≥ 1/2 for some (a, ω) such that (a, ω) 6= (a, ωH), then the Agent chooses
aˆ(ω) = a for all ω in equilibrium.
Proof. By Lemmata 5.1 and 5.2, O1 does not investigate if aω ≤ 1/2 for all (a, ω). By Lemma 5.1,
if O1 does not investigate then the Agent chooses aˆ(ω) = a for all ω. It follows that if aωH ≤ 1/2,
then aˆ(ω) = a for all ω. By a similar argument, if aωL ≥ 1/2, we have aˆ(ω) = a for all ω. So
suppose aωH > 1/2, and aωL < 1/2. There are three cases to consider: 1) aωL, aωH ≥ 1/2, 2)
aωL ≥ 1/2, aωH < 1/2, and 3) aωL < 1/2, aωH ≥ 1/2. Let us start with the first case: 1) By
Lemma 5.1 O1 then either prefers to fire A or prefers to keep A both upon observing (a, ωH), and
upon observing (a, ωH). It follows that A
′s best-response is to choose a when ω = ωL. So assume
that O1 prefers to keep A upon observing (a, ωL), as otherwise A chooses a. But then, note that by
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Lemma 5.1 and by the fact that aωL ≥ 1/2, O1 also prefers to keep A upon observing (a, ωH). But
then, by Lemma 5.2, O1 does not investigate which implies, by Lemma 5.1 that A chooses a when
ω = ωL. In the second case, i.e. when aωL ≥ 1/2, aωH < 1/2, by Lemma 5.1 if O1 prefers to keep
A upon observing (a, ωH) then O1 also prefers to keep A upon observing (a, ωL) and prefers to fire
A upon observing (a, ωH), and upon observing (a, ωL). By Proposition 5.1 it cannot be the case
that A chooses a in both states of the world. So, WLOG, suppose by contradiction that the Agent
chooses a in the high state and a in the low state. But then, as by Lemma 5.1 O1 investigates
in such an equilibrium, A wants to deviate to a in the low state. Finally, in the third case, i.e.
when aωL < 1/2, aωH ≥ 1/2, Lemma 5.1 implies that O1 either always prefers to keep in the high
state, and always prefers to fire in the low state, or the other way around. In either case, A’s
best-response is then to choose aˆ(ω) = a for all ω.
Propositions 5.1 and 5.2 do not imply, however, that the Agent never chooses to exert high
effort when there is a single Overseer. Indeed, our next proposition identifies conditions under
which the Agent chooses to exert high effort in the high state and low effort in the low state. In a
section to be added in the Appendix we show that this is the only equilibrium in which the Agent
is exerting high effort in the single Overseer case.
Proposition 5.3 Suppose there is a single Overseer who has to pay c1 > 0 to observe a, and ω. If
aωH > 1/2, and aω < 1/2 for all (a, ω) such that (a, ω) 6= (a, ωH), then there exist WA,WO1 such
that if WA ≥ WA, and WO1 ≥ WO1 then, in equilibrium, the Overseer investigates and the Agent
chooses
aˆ(ω) =
 a if ω = ωHa otherwise.
In this equilibrium, the Principal chooses the following retention rule: rP (K
O1 |s,K) = rP (KO1 |f, F ) =
1, and rP (K
O1 |s, F ) = rP (KO1 |f,K) = 0.
Moreover, we have WA = k(a− a)/e1, and WO1 =

c1/(e1pi(2aωH − 1)) if pi ≤ 1−2aωL2(aωH−aωL)
c1/(e1(1− pi)(1− 2aωL)) otherwise.
Proof. see Appendix.
The equilibrium in which the Agent chooses to exert high effort appears to brittle, however.
Indeed, if aω > 1/2 for some (a, ω) such that (a, ω) 6= (a, ωH), then in equilibrium the Agent
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chooses aˆ(ω) = a for all ω, independently of the level of wages WA,WO1 . This suggests that if
one widens the set of levels of effort that are available to the Agent, equilibria in which the Agent
chooses the highest level of effort available, at least in some state of the world, are likely to cease
to exist. Indeed, in a robustness section to be written, we show that widening the set of available
levels of effort of the Agent (weakly) decreases the level of effort exerted by the Agent when there is
a single Overseer. In the limit, if the Agent is allowed to choose his level of effort from a continuum,
i.e. a ∈ [0, 1], the Agent can never be motivated to exert positive effort in equilibrium.
5.2 Two Overseers
In this section we show that significant qualitative differences exist between the single Overseer
case and the two Overseers case, when oversight is costly. Indeed, as we establish in proposition
5.4, not only is the range of values of (a, ω) for which equilibria exist in which the Agent chooses
to exert high effort at least in one state of the world significantly wider with two Overseers, there
also exist parameter values for which, in equilibrium, the Agent chooses to exert high effort in both
states of the world with a hierarchy of two Overseers, something we established is never the case
with a single Overseer.
Proposition 5.4 Suppose there is a hierarchy of two Overseers. Then, in equilibrium:
(i) If aωH > 1/2, and aωL < 1/2, then there exist WA,WOi, such that, if WA ≥ WA and, for
all i, WOi ≥WOi, each Overseer Oi investigates and the Agent chooses aˆ(ω) = a for all ω.
(ii) If aωH > 1/2, and aωL < 1/2, then there exist WA,WOi, such that, if WA ≥WA and, for all
i, WOi ≥WOi, each Overseer Oi investigates and the Agent chooses aˆ(ω) =

a if ω = ωH
a otherwise .
(iii) If aωL > 1/2, and aωH < 1/2, then there exist WA,WOi, such that, if WA ≥WA and, for all
i, WOi ≥WOi, each Overseer Oi investigates and the Agent chooses aˆ(ω) =

a if ω = ωH
a otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix.
To understand how the addition of a second Overseer can increase the level of effort exerted
by the Agent compared to the single Overseer case, we present below the strategy profile that
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sustains an equilibrium in which the Agent chooses high effort in both states of the world and
highlight how this strategy profile induces the first Overseer O1 (1) to investigate and (2) to reward
the Agent for high effort and punish him for low effort. Before presenting this strategy profile in
detail, we preview the most important features of the argument. Remember, that in the single
Overseer case the Principal necessarily needs to condition his retention decision of O1 on O1’s own
retention decision of the Agent in order to provide O1 with incentives to investigate. By doing
so, however, the Principal restricts the ability of O1 to commit to a high effort inducing retention
rule for the Agent. When there are two Overseers, the Principal uses a retention rule for O2 which
has three main features. (1) The Principal conditions his retention decision of the second Overseer
O2 on whether O2’s decision to keep or fire the first Overseer O1 matches the policy outcome.
This creates incentives for O2 to investigate in order to learn whether success of failure is more
likely and consequently whether he should keep or fire O1. (2) The retention rule used by the
Principal induces Overseer O2 to fire O1 whenever O2 does not observe (a, ω) and induces O2 to
keep O1 upon observing (aˆ(ω), ω) for some ω. As a consequence, the first Overseer is incentivized
to investigate. Indeed, if the first Overseer O1 does not investigate, the second Overseer O2 is
likely not to observe (a, ω) and unlikely to observe (aˆ(ω), ω). If, on the other hand, O1 investigates,
then O2 is more likely to observe (aˆ(ω), ω), yet not to observe (a, ω). In other words, investigating
increases the probability that O1 will be retained by Overseer O2, which gives O1 incentives to
investigate. (3) The decisive aspect of the retention rule used by the Principal is, however, that he
does not condition his decision to keep or fire O2 on the decision of O1 to keep or fire the Agent.
As a consequence, the second Overseer has no incentive to condition his behavior on the retention
decision of the first Overseer either. But, if the second Overseer investigates and then retains
(or fires) the first Overseer independently on the decision of the first Overseer to keep or fire the
Agent, then the first Overseer is always indifferent between keeping and firing the Agent. The first
Overseer is then free to commit to any retention rule, and in particular to a retention rule that
incentivizes the Agent to exert high effort. In other words, in the presence of the second Overseer,
the Principal can use the second Overseer to incentivize the first Overseer to investigate without
having to condition on whether the first Overseer kept or fired the Agent. The fundamental tension
between Lemmata 5.1 and 5.2 identified in the single Overseer case thus ceases to exist with two
Overseers.
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To make this logic fully apparent, consider the following strategy profile. As we will show,
provided the wages WA,WO1 , and WO2 are sufficiently high, this profile sustains an equilibrium in
which the Agent chooses high effort in both states of the world provided aωH > 1/2, aωL < 1/2
and pi is lower than some threshold pˆi to be derived below. We will later discuss how this profile
needs to be amended for other parameter values of (a, ω) and pi.
(i) The Agent chooses high effort in both states of the world, i.e. aˆ(ω) = a for all ω,
(ii) O1 investigates,
(iii) O1 retains the Agent upon observing high effort or upon not observing the Agent’s effort level
and fires the Agent upon observing low effort, i.e. rO1(K|a, ω) =

1 if a = a
0 if a = a
for all ω, and
rO1(K|∅) = 1,
(iv) O2 investigates upon observing that O1 kept the Agent and upon observing that O1 fired the
Agent, i.e. I2(K) = I2(F ) = 1,
(v) Overseer O2 retains Overseer O1 upon observing high effort in the high state and fires O1
otherwise, i.e. rO2(K
O1 |a, ωH , R) =

1 if a = a
0 otherwise
for all R, rO2(K
O1 |a, ωL, R) = 0 for all
a and all R, rO2(K
O1 |∅, R) = 0 for all R,
(vi) The Principal keeps Overseer O2 either if (1) O2 kept O1 and the policy outcome is suc-
cess or if (2) O2 fired O1 and the policy outcome is failure, i.e. rP (K
O2 |s,KO1 , R) = 1,
rP (K
O2 |s, FO1 , R) = 0, rP (KO2 |f,KO1 , R) = 0, and rP (KO2 |f, FO1 , R) = 1 for all R.
Let us first establish that it is indeed a best-response for the Agent to choose high effort in
both states of the world, given the strategies used by the other players. As the principal-agent
relationship is delegated to the first Overseer, the utility to the Agent of exerting high or low effort
only depends on the behavior of the first Overseer. In the strategy profile under consideration, the
behavior of the first Overseer conforms to the necessary conditions identified in Lemma 5.1 for the
Agent to be incentivized to exert high effort, namely O1 investigates and O1 rewards the Agent for
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high effort, yet punishes him for low effort. As a consequence, the utility to the Agent of exerting
high effort in state of the world ω is
UA(a|ω) = k(1− a) + e1WA + (1− e1)WA
while the utility of exerting low effort is
UA(a|ω) = k(1− a) + (1− e1)WA.
Hence, if the value of being retained in office is sufficiently high, namely WA ≥ k(a − a)/e1, it is
indeed a best-response for the Agent to exert high effort.
Next consider the incentives for Overseer O1 to investigate. Again, the delegated nature of
the principal-agent relationships in the hierarchy implies that the utility to the first Overseer of
investigating only depends on the behavior of the second Overseer. In the strategy profile under
consideration the second Overseer investigates and retains the first Overseer if, and only if, O2
observes (a, ωH). It follows, that the utility to the first Overseer of not investigating is equal to the
probability that O2 observes (a, ωH), although O1 does not investigate, times the value of being
retained in office, i.e. pie∅2WO1 . On the other hand, if Overseer O1 chooses to pay the cost c1 of
investigating then the probability that the second Overseer observes (a, ωH) increases to pie1e2+(1−
e1)pie
∅
2). Overall, the utility to Overseer O1 of investigating is thus (pie1e2 + (1− e1)pie∅2))WO1 − c1.
Hence, if the value of holding office is sufficiently high, i.e. if WO1 ≥ c1e1(e2−e∅2)pi , then it is optimal
for the first Overseer to investigate.
Note that the second Overseer O2 investigates both when O1 keeps the Agent and when O1
fires the Agent. Moreover, O2 does not condition his retention decision of O1 on O1’s own retention
decision of the Agent. It follows that O1 is always indifferent between keeping and firing the Agent.
Hence, any retention rule used by O1 is a best-response.
We now show that O2 investigates both upon observing that O1 kept the Agent and upon
observing that O1 fired the Agent. On the equilibrium path, the first Overseer never fires the
Agent, so the decision of the second Overseer to investigate or not is off-the-equilibrium path as
well. It is therefore a best-response for the second Overseer to investigate. If O2 does not investigate
upon observing that O1 kept the Agent, then O2 does not observe (a, ω) and chooses to fire O1.
Given that the Principal fires O2 unless, either there is policy success and O2 kept O1, or there
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is policy failure and O2 fired O1, the utility to the second Overseer of not investigating, and thus
firing O1, is given by the probability that there is failure times the value of being retained:
UO2(I2(K) = 0, rP ) = pi(1− aωH)WO2 + (1− pi)(1− aωL)WO2 .
If O2 chooses to pay the cost c2 of investigating, however, then with probability pi(e1e2+(1−e1)e∅2),
O2 observes (a, ωH) and decides to keep O1. In all other cases, O2 chooses to fire O1. It follows
that the utility to the second Overseer of investigating is
UO2(I2(K) = 1, rP ) = pi(e1(e2 − e∅2) + e∅2)aωHWO2 + (1− pi)(e1(e2 − e∅2) + e∅2)(1− aωL)WO2
+ (1− (e1(e2 − e∅2) + e∅2))UO2(I2(K) = 0, rP )− c2.
Rearranging, we find that it is a best-response for the second Overseer to investigate upon observing
that the first Overseer kept the Agent, i.e. UO2(I2(K) = 1, rP ) ≥ UO2(I2(K) = 0, rP ), if, and only
if, WO2 ≥ WO2 := c2/((e1(e2 − e∅2) + e∅2)pi(2aωH − 1)). When deciding whether to investigate the
second Overseer thus evaluates the potential benefit of investigating, given by the probability that
he learns he should keep O1 instead of firing him pi(e1e2 + (1− e1)e∅2) times the additional expected
gain of keeping instead of firing in that case (2aωH − 1), against the cost c2 of investigating.
Next, we show that the second Overseer has no incentive to deviate from his retention rule rO2 .
Remember that the Principal keeps the second Overseer if, and only if, either the outcome is success
and O2 retained O1 or the outcome is failure and O2 fired O1. Hence, the second Overseer keeps the
first Overseer when success is more likely than failure and fires the first Overseer otherwise. Now
suppose first that the second Overseer observes (a, ωH). If O2 keeps O1 he receives an expected
payoff of aωHWO2 . Firing, on the other hand, yields an expected payoff of (1− aωH)WO2 . Hence,
as long as, aωH > 1/2 success is more likely than failure and it is a best-response for O2 to keep
O1 upon observing (a, ωH). Similarly, it is a best-response for O2 to fire O1 upon observing (a, ωL)
as long as aωL < 1/2.
Suppose now that O2 does not observe (a, ω). If O2 keeps O1, he receives an expected payoff
of piaωHWO2 + (1 − pi)aωLWO2 . If, on the other hand, he fires O1 he receives pi(1 − aωH)WO2 +
(1 − pi)(1 − aωL)WO2 . Hence, if the probability of being in the high state is sufficiently low, i.e.
pi ≤ pˆi := 1−2aωL2a(ωH−ωL) , it is a best-response for the second Overseer to fire the first Overseer upon
not observing (a, ω).
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Finally, note that the Principal does not condition his retention decision of O2 on the decision
of O1 to keep or fire the Agent. Hence, O2 has no incentive to condition his retention decision of
O1 on R.
The structure of the strategy profile will remain the same for other parameter values of (a, ω)
and pi. First, if the probability of being in the high state is high, pi > pˆi, the Principal may need to
reward Overseer O2 for firing O1 when there is success and for keeping O1 when there is failure in
order to get O2 to prefer firing O1, when O2 does not observe (a, ω). Consequently, O2 will keep
O1 upon observing aˆ(ωL) and fire him upon observing aˆ(ωH).
An implication of proposition 5.4 is that the inability for the Principal of inducing high effort
by the Agent does not go away completely with the addition of a second Overseer. Indeed, there
exists a segment of the parameter space (a, ω) for which, no matter how high the wages are that the
Principal pays to the Agent and the Overseers, no equilibrium exists in which the Agent chooses
to exert high effort in any of the states of the world.
Lemma 5.3 Suppose there is a hierarchy of 2 Overseers. If aωH ≤ 1/2, or if aωL ≥ 1/2, then in
any equilibrium the Agent chooses aˆ(ω) = a for all ω.
Proof. By Lemmata ?? and ??, O2 needs to investigate in order to have an equilibrium in which
A chooses aˆ(ω) = a for some ω. Moreover, by Lemma 5.2, O2 is only willing to investigate if O2
strictly prefers to keep the Agent upon observing (aˆ(ωH), ωH) and strictly prefers to fire the Agent
upon observing (aˆ(ωL), ωL) or vice versa. Finally, by Lemma 5.1, we have either
UO2(K
O1 |a, ωH , R) = aωHWO2 ,
UO2(F
O1 |a, ωH , R) = (1− aωH)WO2 ,
UO2(K
O1 |a, ωL, R) = aωLWO2 ,
and
UO2(F
O1 |a, ωH , R) = (1− aωL)WO2 ,
or
UO2(K
O1 |a, ωH , R) = (1− aωH)WO2 ,
UO2(F
O1 |a, ωH , R) = aωHWO2 ,
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UO2(K
O1 |a, ωL, R) = (1− aωL)WO2 ,
and
UO2(F
O1 |a, ωH , R) = aωLWO2 .
Some simple algebra then establishes the result.
The logic behind this result is somewhat reminiscent of the one Overseer case. By Lemma ??
O2 needs to investigate in equilibrium in order to sustain an equilibrium in which the Agent chooses
aˆ(ω) = a. O2, just as O1 in the one Overseer case, is only willing to investigate, however, if there
exist (a′, ω′) and (a′′, ω′′), with ω 6= ω′, both occurring with positive probability in equilibrium
such that O2 strictly prefers to keep O1 upon observing (a
′, ω′) and strictly prefers to fire O1 upon
observing (a′′, ω′′). When aωH ≤ 1/2 or when aωL ≥ 1/2, there is no retention rule the Principal
could use which satisfies this requirement.
An interpretation of this result is that for the Overseers to be willing to investigate, and thus
for an equilibrium in which the Agent chooses to exert high effort, at least in some state of the
world, the outcome needs to be sufficiently responsive to the effort choice of the Agent so that it is
sufficiently hard to guess the outcome for the last Overseer if he does not know the effort choice of
the Agent.
5.3 N overseers
In the previous section, we have shown how the addition of a second Overseer increases the range
of values (a, ω) for which the Agent can be incentivized to exert high effort in some state of the
world and moreover makes it possible for certain parameter values (a, ω) to sustain an equilibrium
in which the Agent chooses to exert high effort in both states of the world. Interestingly, the same
logic applies when there are more than two Overseers. The Principal will choose a retention rule
of the last Overseer On that only conditions on whether the decision of On to keep or fire On−1
matches the policy outcome or not. For certain parameter values, this retention rule induces On
(1) to investigate, (2) to fire On−1 when On does not observe (a, ω), or when On observes (aˆ(ω), ω)
for some ω and (3) to keep On−1 upon observing (aˆ(ω′), ω′) for some ω′ 6= ω. But then, On−1
will have incentives to investigate in order to increase the probability that On observes (aˆ(ω
′), ω′)
and consequently retains On−1. Moreover, as the Principal does not condition on whether On−1
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keeps or fires On−2, On will retain or dismiss On−1 independently of his retention decision of On−2.
As a consequence, On−1 will be indifferent between keeping and firing On−2. Hence, it will be
a best-response for On−1 (1) to fire On−2 upon not observing (a, ω) and (2) to keep On−2 upon
observing (aˆ(ω), ω) for all ω. This will create incentives for On−2 to investigate in order to increase
the probability that On−1 observes (aˆ(ω), ω). Moreover, On−1 will have no incentive to condition
his retention decision of On−2 on whether On−2 retained or dismissed On−3. As a consequence,
On−2 will be indifferent between keeping and firing On−3. Repeating the argument shows that it is
now possible to incentivize O1 to investigate and to leave O1 indifferent between keeping and firing
the Agent.
Proposition 5.5 Suppose there is a hierarchy of n Overseers, n ≥ 2. Then, in the cheapest
equilibrium:
(i) If aωH > 1/2, and aωL < 1/2, then there exist WA,WOi, such that, if WA ≥ WA and, for
all i, WOi ≥ WOi, each Overseer Oi investigates upon observing the sequence of retention
decisions (ROi−2 , . . . , RO1 , R) and the Agent chooses aˆ(ω) = a for all ω.
(ii) If aωH > 1/2, and aωL < 1/2, then there exist WA,WOi, such that, if WA ≥ WA and, for
all i, WOi ≥ WOi, each Overseer Oi investigates upon observing the sequence of retention
decisions (ROi−2 , . . . , RO1 , R) and the Agent chooses aˆ(ω) =

a if ω = ωH
a otherwise .
(iii) If aωL > 1/2, and aωH < 1/2, then there exist WA,WOi, such that, if WA ≥ WA and, for
all i, WOi ≥ WOi, each Overseer Oi investigates upon observing the sequence of retention
decisions (ROi−2 , . . . , RO1 , R) and the Agent chooses aˆ(ω) =

a if ω = ωH
a otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix.
Two remarks are in order with respect to Proposition 5.5 and previous results. First of all, an
interesting aspect of the analysis so far is that the ability of the Principal of inducing the Agent
to choose high effort requires the conditions to be neither very favorable nor very unfavorable to
induce the Agent to exert high effort. Indeed, if aωH ≤ 1/2, and thus aω ≤ 1/2 for all (a, ω), or if
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aωL ≥ 1/2, and thus aω ≥ 1/2, for all (a, ω), the Agent chooses to exert low effort in both states
of the world, in equilibrium.
Second, in contrast to the comparison between the single Overseer case and the n ≥ 2 Overseers
case, a glance at Proposition 5.5 reveals a certain level of continuity between hierarchies of higher
magnitude. To be sure, for any values of a, a, ωL, and ωH if a certain level of effort of the Agent
is in principle achievable in equilibrium with n Overseers, n ≥ 2, then it is also achievable with
m 6= n Overseers, m ≥ 2.
As in the two Overseers case, the inability for the Principal of inducing high effort by the Agent
does not generally go away with longer hierarchies of Overseers. Indeed there exists a segment of
the parameter space (a, ω) for which, no matter how high the wages are that the Principal pays to
the Agent and the Overseers, no equilibrium exists in which the Agent chooses to exert high effort
in any of the states of the world.
Lemma 5.4 Suppose there is a hierarchy of n Overseers, n ≥ 2. If aωH ≤ 1/2, or if aωL ≥ 1/2,
then in any equilibrium the Agent chooses aˆ(ω) = a for all ω.
Proof.
In proposition 5.5 we state that the Agent can be incentivized to exert a certain positive level
of effort provided his wage WA and the wages of the Overseers in the hierarchy WOi exceed certain
respective thresholds WA,WOi . In the following proposition, we give the expressions for these wage
levels WA,WOi .
Proposition 5.6 Suppose there is a hierarchy of n Overseers, n ≥ 2.
(i) The lowest wage that induces the Agent to invest high effort in either or both states of the
world is independent of the oversight hierarchy and is equal to WA = k(a− a)/e1.
(ii) The following wage levels WOi , i < n, are the lowest wage levels for which, in the cheapest
equilibrium, the Agent exerts high effort in either or both states of the world:
If n = 2, we have WO1 =
c1
e1(e2−e∅2)pi
, whenever pi ≤ pˆi(aˆ(ω)), and WO1 = c1e1(e2−e∅2)(1−pi) ,
whenever pi > pˆi(aˆ(ω)).5
5The level of pˆi(aˆ(ω)) depends on the equilibrium level of effort of the Agent. If aˆ(ωH) = a, we have pˆi(aˆ(ω)) :=
1−2aˆ(ωL)ωL




For all i, such that 2 6= i ≤ n− 2, we have WOi = cie∅i (ei+1−e∅i+1) .
If n = 3, then WO2 =
c2
(e1(e2−e∅2)+e∅2)(e3−e∅3)pi
, whenever pi ≤ pˆi(aˆ(ω)), and WO2 = c2(e1(e2−e∅2)+e∅2)(e3−e∅3)(1−pi) ,
whenever pi > pˆi(aˆ(ω)).
If n ≥ 4, then WO2 = c2(e1(e2−e∅2)+e∅2)(e3−e∅3) . Moreover, WOn−1 =
cn−1
e∅n−1(en−e∅n)pi
, whenever pi ≤
pˆi(aˆ(ω)), and WOn−1 =
cn−1
e∅n−1(en−e∅n)(1−pi)
, whenever pi > pˆi(aˆ(ω)).
(iii) The lowest wage level WOn at which On investigates in the cheapest equilibrium is given by
the following:
If n = 2, and aˆ(ωH) = a, we have WO2 =
c2
(e1(e2−e∅2)+e∅2)pi(2aˆ(ωH)ωH−1)




whenever pi > pˆi(aˆ(ω)).
If n = 2, and aˆ(ωH) = a, we have WO2 =
c2
(e1(e2−e∅2)+e∅2)pi(1−2aˆ(ωH)ωH)




whenever pi > pˆi(aˆ(ω)).
If n ≥ 3, and aˆ(ωH) = a, then WOn = cne∅npi(2aˆ(ωH)ωH−1) whenever pi ≤ pˆi(aˆ(ω)), and WOn =
cn
e∅npi(1−2aˆ(ωL)ωL) whenever pi > pˆi(aˆ(ω)).
If n ≥ 3, and aˆ(ωH) = a, then WOn = cne∅npi(1−2aˆ(ωH)ωH) whenever pi ≤ pˆi(aˆ(ω)), and WOn =
cn
e∅npi(2aˆ(ωL)ωL−1) whenever pi > pˆi(aˆ(ω)).
Proof. See Appendix.
As is apparent from proposition 5.6, the expressions for WO2 differ from those of the other
Overseers. This stems from an asymmetry in the retention rule used by the first Overseer with
respect to the Agent. Indeed, in equilibrium, every Overseer O1<i<n fires the subordinate Overseer
Oi−1 upon not observing (a, ω) and retains Oi−1 upon observing (aˆ(ω), ω). As a result, the decision
of Oi to keep or fire Oi−1 is an informative signal to Oi+1 about whether Oi observed (a, ω) or
not. Hence, the probability that Oi+1 learns (a, ω) depends on ei+1 and e
∅
i+1, but not on ei. In
contrast, on the equilibrium path, O1 retains the Agent upon observing (aˆ(ω), ω) but also upon not
observing (a, ω). It follows that O2 is uncertain as to whether the first Overseer observed (a, ω). As
a result the probability that O2 observes (a, ω) and hence the incentives to investigate depend on




6If aωH < 1/2, then in the cheapest equilibrium O1 fires A upon not observing (a, ω). For the same reasons
discussed with respect to the equilibrium profile of proposition 9.1, this equilibrium is brittle and would cease to exist
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The comparative statics with respect to the wage levels are generally as expected. In particular,
the lowest wage WOi at which Oi investigates in equilibrium is increasing in the cost of investigating
ci, and decreasing in the probability e
∅
i that Oi observes (a, ω) upon investigating, although Oi−1
did not. More interesting is the fact that for all Overseers Oi, with the exception of Overseer
On, WOi also depends on the probability that the superior Overseer Oi+1 observes. Indeed, in
equilibrium Oi is only retained if Oi+1 observes (a, ω). Remember also that the probability that
Oi+1 observes (a, ω) increases from e
∅
i+1 to ei+1, when Oi observes (a, ω) himself. The impetus for
Oi to investigate is then to observe (a, ω) in order to increase the probability that Oi+1 observes
(a, ω) as well. It follows that WOi is decreasing in (ei+1 − e∅i+1), as well as in ei+1, but increasing
in e∅i+1. Indeed, when (ei+1 − e∅i+1) increases, so does the difference between the probability that
Oi is retained in expectation when investigating compared to when he does not investigate, which
increases the incentives for Oi to investigate. Similarly, as e
∅
i+1 increases, Oi is more likely to be
retained when he does not investigate which reduces the incentives for Oi to investigate. It follows
that there is a potential upside and a potential downside to the Principal of e∅i increasing. Indeed,
when e∅i increases, the incentives for Oi to investigate increase, but at the same time the incentives
for Oi−1 to investigate decrease. We return to this tension at the end of section 6.
Finally, WOn is decreasing in the difference of the expected value of keeping On−1 versus firing
On−1 upon observing the state of the world and the level of effort for which On would prefer to
keep On−1. Indeed, On prefers to fire On−1 upon not observing (a, ω). Hence, On investigates to
learn whether he should keep On−1 instead. The more it would be a mistake to fire On−1 upon
observing the corresponding (a, ω), the more On has incentives to investigate.
6 Which Hierarchy is Best?
Based on the characterization of the cheapest equilibria presented in the previous sections, we are
now able to give answers to the question about the optimal hierarchy. We proceed in a series of
steps. First, we ask under what conditions it is valuable to the Principal to add a marginal Overseer
to a given hierarchy. We then proceed to study under what conditions the Principal would prefer
when the set of the Agent’s effort levels is expanded. The qualitative nature of the results is the same across these
two equilibria. To avoid additional mathematical clutter we thus focus on the more robust case.
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to hire a hierarchy of Overseers rather than to monitor the Agent directly. Finally, we study how
the effectiveness of the hierarchy depends on how likely the Overseers are to become informed.
6.1 The Value of Marginal Overseers
We now study how the addition of a marginal Overseer affects the level of effort exerted by the
Agent. We start by noticing that proposition 5.6 entails interesting dynamics, as captured in the
following corollary, with respect to the lowest wage that the Principal needs to pay certain Overseers
to induce them to investigate in equilibrium.
Corollary 6.1 For any number n, n+ 1 hierarchies of Overseers, n ≥ 2, holding fixed the level of
effort exerted by the Agent in the cheapest equilibrium, and holding fixed a, a, ωL, ωH , and for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ci, ei, and e∅i we have the following
(i) the lowest Wage that the Principal needs to pay to the n − 1th Overseer in order for On−1
to investigate in the cheapest equilibrium is lower in the n + 1 Overseers case than in the n
Overseers case;
(ii) the lowest Wage that the Principal needs to pay to the nth Overseer in order for On to
investigate in the cheapest equilibrium is lower (higher) in the n + 1 Overseers case than in
the n Overseers case, if the difference in probabilities (en+1− e∅n+1) that On+1 observes (a, ω)
upon investigating when On observed compared to when On did not observe is sufficiently high
(low);
(iii) the lowest Wage that the Principal needs to pay to the other Overseers in order for those
Overseers to investigate in the cheapest equilibrium is not altered by adding an Overseer.
Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 5.6.
The intuition for these results is as follows. Consider the case where in equilibrium the Agent
chooses high effort in both states of the world. Remember that by Lemma 5.2, for On to investigate
it must be the case that On strictly prefers to fire On−1 upon observing (a, ωH) and strictly prefers to
fire On−1 upon observing (a, ωL) (or vice versa). As a consequence, On−1 investigates to increase the
probability that On will observe (a, ωH). Suppose we add an additional Overseer On+1 at the top of
the hierarchy, then On is indifferent between keeping and firing On−1 both upon observing (a, ωH),
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and upon observing (a, ωL). In the cheapest equilibrium, On now keeps On−1 upon observing (a, ω)
for all ω. This, in turn, increases the probability that On−1 is retained upon investigating, and thus
decreases the minimum wage level at which On−1 chooses to investigate in equilibrium.
An important implication of these wage shifting dynamics is that there are conditions under
which the Principal can induce the Agent to exert a given level of effort more cheaply when hiring
additional overseers. Indeed, we have the following result:
Corollary 6.2 For any number n ≥ 2 of Overseers, holding fixed a, a, ωL, ωH , and for all i ∈
{1, . . . , n}, ci, ei, and e∅i , if aωH > 1/2, and aωL < 1/2, then there exists cn+1, en+1, and e∅n+1 such
that the lowest sum of wages that the Principal needs to pay in order to induce the Agent to exert
a given level of effort is lower with n+ 1 Overseers than with n Overseers.
Proof. Follows from corollary 6.1, and proposition 5.6.
The logic is straightforward. Corollary 6.1 states that by adding On+1 to the hierarchy, the
wages that need to be paid to On−1, and On go down, provided (en+1−e∅n+1) is sufficiently high. If
the costs of investigating for On+1 are sufficiently low such that the wage that the Principal needs
to pay to On+1 is not too high, then the benefit of adding On+1, namely lower wages for On−1, and
On, will outweigh the additional cost of hiring On+1.
Holding fixed the vector of wages (WA,WO1 , . . . ,WOn) we now ask what effect the addition of a
marginal Overseer has on the level of effort exerted by the Agent. We first show that there always
exist conditions under which adding an Overseer increases the level of effort of the Agent.
Proposition 6.1 For any number n of Overseers, there is a vector of Wages (WA,WO1 , . . . ,WOn),
and a range of values for a, a, ωL, ωH , en+1, and e
∅
n+1 such that adding an Overseer On+1, and paying
On+1 a sufficiently high wage, increases the level of effort exerted by the Agent.
Proof. Follows from lemmata ??, ??, corollary 6.1, and propositions 5.5, 5.6.
In corollary 6.1 we established that adding an Overseer to a hierarchy of n Overseers decreases
the wage that the Principal needs to pay to the n − 1th Overseer to induce him to investigate,
and may decrease the wage of the nth Overseer when the difference in probabilities (en+1 − e∅n+1)
is sufficiently high. The logic behind the previous result should then be clear. Consider a wage
profile such that the wage paid to WOn−1 is too low for On−1 to investigate in equilibrium when
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there are n Overseers, yet sufficiently high that On−1 would investigate in equilibrium when there
are n+ 1 Overseers. Suppose further that the wage paid to the other Overseers is sufficiently high
for them to investigate with n Overseers. In this case, when there are only n Overseers, On−1 never
investigates. By Lemma ?? this trickles down in the hierarchy and leads O1 not to investigate
either. But then the Agent chooses to exert low effort in both states of the world. If an Overseer
is added at the top of the hierarchy and two requirements are satisfied, namely that the wage paid
to On+1 is sufficiently high for him to investigate and the difference in probabilities (en+1 − e∅n+1)
is sufficiently high that the addition of On+1 does not reduce the willingness of On to investigate,
then the addition of On+1 leads every Overseer to investigate and thus incentivizes the Agent to
exert high effort in some state of the world, whenever aωH > 1/2, and aωL < 1/2.
More is true, however. Indeed, suppose aωH > 1/2 and aωL < 1/2. Then, there exist wage
vectors (WA,WO1 , . . . ,WOn) such that, in equilibrium, the Agent chooses high effort in both states
of the world but there also exist wage vectors such that, in equilibrium, the Agent exerts high effort




e∅npi(1−2aωL) . Then, given the level of WOn there is no equilibrium in which the Agent
chooses aˆ(ω) = a for all ω and the last Overseer On investigates, although there is an equilibrium
in which the Agent exerts high effort in the high state and low effort in the low state, provided
the wages are sufficiently high for the Agent and for the Overseers O1, . . . , On−1. As shown in
corollary 6.1, adding an additional Overseer On+1 may decrease the minimum wage at which On
can be incentivized to investigate in equilibrium. It follows that the addition of Overseer On+1 may
improve the equilibrium level of effort of the Agent from aˆ(ω) =

a if ω = ωH
a if ω = ωL
to aˆ(ω) = a for
all ω. Similar reasoning shows that the addition of a marginal Overseer may also reduce the level
of effort exerted by the Agent from aˆ(ω) = a for all ω to aˆ(ω) =

a if ω = ωH
a if ω = ωL
. This happens,







thus have the following result:
Proposition 6.2 For any number n of Overseers, there is a vector of Wages (WA,WO1 , . . . ,WOn),
and a range of values for a, a, ωL, and ωH such that aˆ(ω) = a for all ω. Holding fixed (WA,WO1 , . . . ,WOn),
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there exist en+1, and e
∅
n+1 and cutpoints W
L
On+1
,WHOn+1 such that if On+1 is added to the hierarchy
the following is true. If WOn+1 > W
H
On+1
, then aˆ(ω) = a for all ω. If WHOn+1 > WOn+1 ≥ WLOn+1 ,
then aˆ(ω) =

a if ω = ωH
a if ω = ωL
. And if WLOn+1 > WOn+1 , then aˆ(ω) = a for all ω.
7
6.2 Optimal Oversight Hierarchies
Our next set of results studies more generally when the Principal is better off hiring a hierarchy as
opposed to monitor the Agent directly. We first show that, holding fixed the wage of the Agent,
there are conditions under which hiring a hierarchy increases the level of effort exerted by the
Agent.
Proposition 6.3 Suppose there are n Overseers, n ≥ 1.
(i) If WA < k(a−a)/e1, then A chooses aˆ(ω) = a for all ω in equilibrium regardless of the length
of the hierarchy of Overseers.
(ii) If WA ≥ max{k(a−a)/e1, k/ωL}, then, the addition of Overseers can never increase the level
of effort exerted by the Agent and reduces it when either aωH ≤ 1/2, or aωL ≥ 1/2.
(iii) If k/ωL > WA ≥ max{k(a− a)/e1, k/ωH}, then:
(a) if aωH > 1/2, and aωL < 1/2, there exists a wage vector (WO1 , . . . ,WOn), n ≥ 2,
that improves the probability of success by increasing the level of effort from aˆ(ω) =
a if ω = ωH
a if ω = ωL
to aˆ(ω) = a for all ω.
(b) if aωL, aωH > 1/2, and aωL < 1/2, there is no wage vector (WO1 , . . . ,WOn) that improves
the probability of success.
(c) if aωL > 1/2, and aωH < 1/2, there exists a wage vector (WO1 , . . . ,WOn), n ≥ 2,
that may improve the probability of success by changing the Agent’s effort level from
aˆ(ω) =

a if ω = ωH
a if ω = ωL
to aˆ(ω) =

a if ω = ωH
a if ω = ωL
.
7Adding an Overseer may alter the equilibrium level of effort of the Agent in yet other ways. The details are yet
to be filled in.
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(iv) If k/ωH > WA ≥ k(a− a)/e1, then there is no vector of wages that will decrease the level of
effort exerted by the Agent and there is a wage vector (WO1 , . . . ,WOn), that increase the level
of effort exerted by the Agent and will never decrease it.
Proof. Follows from combining Lemma 4.1 and Proposition 5.5.
An implication of Proposition 6.3 is the existence of conditions under which, given a fixed
wage level WA for the Agent, the hiring of a hierarchy of Overseers may increase the level of
effort exerted by the Agent. One necessary condition in this context is that the probability that
Overseer O1 observes (a, ω) upon investigating needs to be sufficiently high. Indeed, a hierarchy
of Overseers can only increase the level of effort of the Agent if there exists some ω such that
k/ω > WA ≥ k(a−a)/e1. Hence, the hierarchy of Overseers can only increase the effort level of the
Agent if e1 > ω(a− a) for some ω. Provided this necessary condition is satisfied, there always exist
wage levels WA for the Agent and parameter values for a, a, ωL, and ωH , such that the Principal
can increase the level of effort by the Agent by hiring a hierarchy of n Overseers, n ≥ 2, and paying
them sufficiently high wages.
Even when the Principal cannot induce the Agent to exert high effort in both states of the
world by hiring a hierarchy, it may still be the case that hiring a hierarchy improves the probability
of a positive policy outcome relative to the no Overseers case. Indeed, if there is a high probability
that the state of the world is low, the probability of policy success will be higher if the Agent
chooses high effort in the low state and low effort in the high state than if the Agent chooses
high effort in the high state and low effort in the low state. In the absence of a hierarchy, there
is no equilibrium in which the Agent chooses low effort in the high state and high effort in the
low state. As shown in Proposition 5.5 there are conditions under which in equilibrium the Agent
chooses aˆ(ω) =

a if ω = ωH
a if ω = ωL
. As a result the hiring of an oversight hierarchy may increase the
probability of policy success by inducing the Agent to choose low effort in the high state and high
effort in the low state rather than high effort in the high state and low effort in the low state.
More importantly, in terms of the question of whether the Principal should hire a hierarchy or
not, it is also the case that the Principal may induce a certain level of effort by the Agent more
cheaply by hiring a hierarchy:
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Corollary 6.3 For any number of n ≥ 2 of Overseers, holding fixed a, a, ωL, and ωH , if aωH > 1/2,
and aωL < 1/2, then there exists ci, ei, and e
∅
i with i = 1, . . . , n, such that the lowest sum of wages
that the Principal needs to pay to the Agent, and the Overseers to induce a certain level of effort
by the Agent is lower than the lowest wage the Principal would have to pay to the Agent alone.
Proof. Follows from corollary 6.2, proposition 5.5, and lemma 4.1.
We explain the nature of the result in the two Overseers case. By corollary 6.2, the logic
then extends to any number n of Overseers, n ≥ 2. Suppose aωH > 1/2, and aωL < 1/2. With two
Overseers, the lowest sum of wages the Principal has to pay to induce the Agent to choose aˆ(ω) = a,







, whereas without Overseers,
the Principal needs to pay the Agent at least k/ωL. It is then obvious that if the probability e1
that the first Overseer O1 observes (a, ω) upon investigating is sufficiently high and the costs of
investigating c1, and c2 are sufficiently low, the Principal can induce the Agent to choose high effort
in both states of the world at a lower cost with two Overseers than with none.
6.3 When is Information Beneficial?
We now study how the effectiveness of the hierarchy depends on the probability that Overseers
become informed about (a, ω) upon investigating. In section ?? we showed that WA is decreasing
in e1, and WOi is decreasing in ei+1 for all i. If we consider a fixed wage vector (WA,WO1 , . . . ,WOn),
this implies that the level of effort of the Agent is weakly increasing in ei. At first sight, this seems
rather intuitive and corresponds to the insights obtained via the baseline models of section 4 which
showed that for a hierarchy to be beneficial to the Principal the Overseers need to be better informed
than the Principal. Remember, however, that ei is the probability that Overseer Oi observes (a, ω)
upon investigating, conditional on Oi−1 having observed (a, ω). Perhaps surprisingly, results are
very different when we consider e∅i , i.e. the probability that Oi observes (a, ω) although Oi−1 did
not. Indeed, in section ?? we identified a tension in how the minimum wages WOi at which Oi
can be incentivized to investigate in equilibrium decrease in e∅i , but increase in e
∅
i+1. This begs the
question whether hiring a hierarchy to induce a certain level of effort by the Agent is cheaper when
the e∅i ’s are lower or when they are higher. As it turns out, hiring a hierarchy is cheaper for the
Principal when e∅i = 0 for all i. The structure of the cheapest equilibrium is almost identical when
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e∅i = 0 for all i, then when e
∅
i > 0. In both cases, Oi provides incentives for Oi−1 to investigate by
firing Oi−1 whenever Oi does not observe (a, ω) and keeping Oi−1 whenever Oi observes (aˆ(ω), ω)
at least for some ω. The difference is that each Oi investigates upon observing any sequence of
retention decisions (ROi−2, . . . , R) when e∅i > 0. When e
∅
i = 0, Oi has no incentive to investigate
upon observing that some subordinate Overseer Oj<i fired Oj−1 as this is an indication that (a, ω)
was not observed and hence, as e∅i = 0, that Oi will not be able to observe (a, ω) either. As a result,
Oi only investigates in equilibrium upon observing that every Overseer Oj<i kept his subordinate
Oj−1, i.e. upon learning that Overseer Oi−1 observed (a, ω). This has two consequences: (1) The
minimum wage level WOi at which Oi chooses to investigate does not depend on e
∅
i anymore, but




n > 0, whereas WOn =
cn
enpi(2aω−1) when
e∅n = 0.8 As ei > e∅i , Oi can be incentivized to investigate in equilibrium upon observing that every
Overseer kept his subordinate at a wage that is lower when e∅i = 0. (2) The incentives that Oi
provides to Oi−1 to investigate are strongest, as WOi is decreasing in (ei+1− e∅i+1). Indeed, if Oi−1
does not investigate he will not learn (a, ω). This, in turn, implies that Oi will not learn (a, ω)
either and will thus fire Oi−1. It follows that Oi−1 receives a utility of 0 when he chooses not to
investigate. Hence, in order to have any chance of being retained Oi must investigate. For example,




when e∅i > 0. We thus have the following:
Proposition 6.4 (i) Consider any wage vector (WA,WO1 , . . . ,WOn) such that, if e
∅
i = 0 for all
i, the Agent chooses aˆ(ω) = a for all ω in equilibrium. For any such wage vector, and for any
i ≥ 2, there exist e∅i , e∅i > 0 such that, if 0 < e∅i < e∅i or if e∅i < e∅i < ei, the Agent chooses
aˆ(ω) = a for all ω in equilibrium.
(ii) Consider any wage vector (WA,WO1 , . . . ,WOn) such that, if e
∅
i = 0 for all i, the Agent does
not choose aˆ(ω) = a for all ω in equilibrium. Then there does not exist (e1, e
∅
2, . . . , e
∅
n) ≥ 0
such that the Agent chooses aˆ(ω) = a for all ω in equilibrium.
Proof. To be added.
The first part of Proposition 6.4 states that compared to an environment in which the Overseers
can only observe the effort level of the Agent when subordinate Overseers observed the effort of
8A full derivation of WOi for all i when e
∅
i = 0 can be found in proposition 9.2 in the Appendix.
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the Agent as well, the effectiveness of the hierarchy at providing incentives for the Agent to exert
effort may be diminished when Overseers can observe the effort level of the Agent even when
subordinate Overseers did not. As discussed above this can essentially happen for two reasons.
First, when e∅i > 0 is too small the wage WOi may not be high enough anymore to induce Oi to
investigate. Second, when e∅i is too high, the difference (ei − e∅i ) may be too small and the wage
WOi−1 may be too low for Oi−1 to investigate. In both cases, Lemmata ?? and ?? then imply that
the Agent chooses aˆ(ω) = a in equilibrium. Similar reasoning then establishes the second part of
the proposition. What our analysis then shows is that to provide powerful incentives within the
hierarchy itself the conditions under which information is acquired matter a great deal. Being better
able to observe the effort level of the Agent, although subordinate Overseers failed to monitor the
Agent’s effort properly, is creating disincentives for subordinate Overseers to investigate which may
hurt the Principal.
7 Comparison to Auditors
So far we have shown that the Principal may be able to provide the Agent with better incentives
to exert high effort by delegating the power to retain or fire the Agent to two or more Overseers
organized hierarchically. Another possibility for the Principal would be to hire auditor(s) who
provide the Principal with reports as to whether the Agent should be retained or not but where the
decision to keep or fire the Agent remains with the Principal. We now study the advantages and
disadvantages of hiring auditors instead of Overseers under the conditions of costly information
acquisition.
We first show that there is no reason for the Principal to hire a single auditor.
Proposition 7.1 Suppose there is a single auditor. Then, the agent chooses aˆ(ω) = a for all ω in
equilibrium if, and only if, WA ≥ k/ωL.
Proof. To be added.
The argument is reminiscent of the single Overseer case. Indeed, in Lemma 4.1 we showed that,
in the absence of Overseers, the Principal can incentivize the Agent to choose high effort in both
states of the world by retaining the Agent when there is policy success and firing him when there
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is policy failure, provided that WA ≥ k/ωL. With a single auditor, the Principal retains the power
to keep or fire the Agent. Hence, in order to incentivize the Agent to choose aˆ(ω) = a for all ω,
although WA < k/ωL, it must be the case that the auditor provides the Principal with a report
that informs the Principal that the Agent exerted high effort and thus leads the Principal to keep
the Agent even when the policy outcome is failure. For the report sent out by the auditor to be
informative to the Principal about the effort exerted by the Agent, it must be the case that the
auditor sends out one report when the Agent exerted high effort and another report when the Agent
exerted low effort. Now consider an equilibrium in which the Agent chooses high effort in both
states of the world. By Lemma 5.2, the auditor only investigates if he strictly prefers to advise the
Principal to retain the Agent upon observing (a, ωH) and strictly prefers to advise the Principal to
fire upon observing (a, ωL). By Lemma 5.1 this can only be the case if aωH > 1/2 > aωL > aωL.
This, in turn, implies that the single Auditor sends the same report to the Principal when the
Auditor observes (a, ωL) than when he observes (a, ωL). But then the Auditor is essentially unable
to provide the Principal with a sensible report in the low state. The Principal is then better off
disregarding the auditors report and retaining the Agent if, and only if, the policy outcome is
success.
Proposition 7.2 Suppose k(a− a) ≤WA < k/ωH , e1 = e2 = 1, and aωL < 1/2 then there do not
exist WS1 and WS2 such that in equilibrium the Agent chooses aˆ(ω) = a.
9
Let e1 = e2 = 1 and aωL < 1/2 then in the cheapest equilibrium with two auditors we have
WA = k/ωH , WSi =

ci/pi if pi ≤ 1/2
ci/(1− pi) if pi > 1/2
. Hence, if aωH and a are sufficiently high, two
overseers is cheaper than two auditors.
8 Conclusion/ Further Research
TBA
9This is likely to be also true for e1, e2 6= 1. I need to check the robustness of the argument.
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Proposition 9.1 Suppose there is a single Overseer who has to pay c1 > 0 to observe a, and ω. If
aωH > 1/2, and aω < 1/2 for all (a, ω) such that (a, ω) 6= (a, ωH), then there exist WA,WO1 such
that if WA ≥ WA, and WO1 ≥ WO1 then, in equilibrium, the Overseer investigates and the Agent
chooses
aˆ(ω) =
 a if ω = ωHa otherwise.
In this equilibrium, the Principal chooses the following retention rule: rP (K
O1 |s,K) = rP (KO1 |f, F ) =
1, and rP (K
O1 |s, F ) = rP (KO1 |f,K) = 0.
Moreover, we have WA = k(a− a)/e1, and WO1 =

c1/(e1pi(2aωH − 1)) if pi ≤ 1−2aωL2(aωH−aωL)
c1/(e1(1− pi)(1− 2aωL)) otherwise.
Proof. Consider the following strategy profile:
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(i) A chooses aˆ(ω) =







1 if a = a
0 otherwise
,
rˆO1(K|a, ωL) = 0, for all a,
rˆO1(K|∅) = 0 or 1.
(iv) rP (K
O1 |s,K) = rP (KO1 |f, F ) = 1, and rP (KO1 |s, F ) = rP (KO1 |f,K) = 0.
(i) A has no incentive to deviate. Indeed, we have
UA(a, I1, rO1 |ωH) = k(1− a) + e1WA + (1− e1)rO1(K|∅)WA
≥ k(1− a) + (1− e1)rO1(K|∅)WA = UA(a, I1, rO1 |ωH),
if, and only if, WA ≥WA := k(a− a)/e1. Moreover, as a > a,
UA(a, I1, rO1 |ωL) = k(1− a) + (1− e1)rO1(K|∅)WA
< k(1− a) + (1− e1)rO1(K|∅)WA = UA(a, I1, rO1 |ωL).
Hence, A has no incentive to deviate if WA ≥WA.
(ii) O1 investigates. Consider first the case in which rˆO1(K|∅) = 0. Then, if O1 does not investi-
gate, he chooses to fire the Agent. Hence, UO1(I1 = 0) = pi(1−aωH)WO1+(1−pi)(1−aωL)WO1 .
If O1 chooses to investigate, he will keep the Agent upon observing (a, ωH) and fire him oth-
erwise. Hence,
UO1(I1 = 1) = e1 [piaωH + (1− pi)aωL]WO1+(1−e1) [pi(1− aωH)WO1 + (1− pi)(1− aωL)WO1 ]−c1.
Rearranging, we find that UO1(I1 = 1) ≥ UO1(I1 = 0) if, and only if, WO1 ≥ c1/e1pi(2aωH−1).
Similar derivations show that UO1(I1 = 1) ≥ UO1(I1 = 0) if, and only if, WO1 ≥ c1/e1(1 −
pi)(1− 2aωL), when rO1(K|∅) = 1.
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(iii) O1 has no incentive to deviate from rO1 . We have
UO1(K|a, ωH) = aωHWO1 > (1− aωH)WO1 = UO1(F |a, ωH) if, and only if aωH > 1/2,
UO1(K|a, ωH) = aωHWO1 ≤ (1− aωH)WO1 = UO1(F |a, ωH) if, and only if aωH ≤ 1/2,
UO1(K|a, ωL) = aωLWO1 ≤ (1− aωL)WO1 = UO1(F |a, ωL) if, and only if aωL ≤ 1/2,
and
UO1(K|a, ωL) = aωLWO1 < (1− aωL)WO1 = UO1(F |a, ωL) if, and only if aωL < 1/2.
(iv) As this is a moral hazard game, the Principal is indifferent between keeping and firing and
has no incentive to deviate.
Proof of Lemma ??. Denote rO1(K|∅) the probability that O1 keeps A upon observing nothing.
As O1 does not investigate O1 never observes (a, ω). Hence,
UA(a, rO1 |ω) = k(1− a) + rO1(K|∅)WA
> k(1− a) + rO1(K|∅)WA
= UA(a, rO1 |ω)
Proof of Lemma ??. Consider a sequence of retention decisions (ROi−3 , . . . , RO1 , R) and suppose
that
Ii(K
Oi−2 , ROi−3 , . . . , RO1 , R) = Ii(F




Oi−2 , ROi−3 , . . . , RO1 , R), rOi |a, ω) =
rOi(K
Oi−1 |∅,KOi−2 , ROi−3 , . . . , RO1 , R)WOi−1 ,
for all (a, ω) while
UOi−1(F
Oi−2 , Ii(F
Oi−2 , ROi−3 , . . . , RO1 , R), rOi |a, ω) =
rOi(K
Oi−1 |∅, FOi−2 , ROi−3 , . . . , RO1 , R)WOi−1 ,
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for all (a, ω).
Assume rOi(K
Oi−1 |∅,KOi−2 , ROi−3 , . . . , RO1 , R) > rOi(KOi−1 |∅, FOi−2 , ROi−3 , . . . , RO1 , R). Then,
Oi−1 strictly prefers to keep Oi−2 for all (a, ω) upon observing (ROi−3 , . . . , RO1 , R).
But then,
UOi−1(Ii−1(R
Oi−3 , . . . , RO1 , R) = 0|a(ω), Ii, rOi) = rOi(KOi−1 |∅,KOi−2 , ROi−3 , . . . , RO1 , R)WOi−1 ,
> rOi(K
Oi−1 |∅,KOi−2 , ROi−3 , . . . , RO1 , R)WOi−1 − ci−1
= UOi−1(Ii−1(R
Oi−3 , . . . , RO1 , R) = 1|a(ω), Ii, rOi).
It follows that Oi−1 chooses not to investigate upon observing (ROi−3 , . . . , RO1 , R), i.e.
Ii−1(ROi−3 , . . . , RO1 , R) = 0.
A similar argument shows that
Ii−1(ROi−3 , . . . , RO1 , R) = 0
if rOi(K
Oi−1 |∅,KOi−2 , ROi−3 , . . . , RO1 , R) ≤ rOi(KOi−1 |∅, FOi−2 , ROi−3 , . . . , RO1 , R)
Proof of Lemma ??. TBA
Proof of Lemma 5.2. WLOG assumeOn weakly prefers to keepA upon observing (aˆ(ω), ω,R
On−2 , . . . , R)
and upon observing (aˆ(ω′), ω′, ROn−2 , . . . , R) with ω 6= ω′, then
UOn(In(R
On−2 , . . . , R) = 0, rP ) = pi
[
aˆ(ωH)ωHrP (K
On |s,KOn−1 , ROn−2 , . . . , R) + (1− aˆ(ωH)ωH)rP (KOn |f,KOn−1 , ROn−2 , . . . , R)
]
WOn
+ (1− pi) [aˆ(ωL)ωLrP (KOn |s,KOn−1 , ROn−2 , . . . , R) + (1− aˆ(ωL)ωL)rP (KOn |f,KOn−1 , ROn−2 , . . . , R)]WOn ,
while
UOn(In(R
On−2 , . . . , R) = 1, rP ) = e1UOn(In(R
On−2 , . . . , R) = 0, rP )+(1−e1)UOn(In(ROn−2 , . . . , R) = 0, rP )−cn.
But then On does not want to investigate.
Proof of Lemma 5.1. Assume, by contradiction, that
rP (K
On |s,KOn−1, ROn−2 , . . . , R) = rP (KOn |s, FOn−1, ROn−2 , . . . , R).
Then, UOn(K
On−1 |a, ω, In−1, . . . , I1, ROn−2 , . . . , R) = aωrP (KOn |s,KOn−1, ROn−2 , . . . , R)WOn+(1−
aω)rP (K
On |f,KOn−1, ROn−2 , . . . , R)WOn , while
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UOn(F
On−1 |a, ω, In−1, . . . , I1, ROn−2 , . . . , R) = aωrP (KOn |s, FOn−1, ROn−2 , . . . , R)WOn + (1 −
aω)rP (K
On |f, FOn−1, ROn−2 , . . . , R)WOn . As
rP (K
On |s,KOn−1, ROn−2 , . . . , R) = rP (KOn |s, FOn−1, ROn−2 , . . . , R),
we thus have UOn(K
On−1 |a, ω, In−1, . . . , I1, ROn−2 , . . . , R) ≥ UOn(FOn−1 |a, ω, In−1, . . . , I1, ROn−2 , . . . , R)
for all (a, ω) if
rP (K
On |f,KOn−1, ROn−2 , . . . , R) ≥ rP (KOn |s, FOn−1, ROn−2 , . . . , R),
and UOn(K
On−1 |a, ω, In−1, . . . , I1, ROn−2 , . . . , R) ≤ UOn(FOn−1 |a, ω, In−1, . . . , I1, ROn−2 , . . . , R) for
all (a, ω) if
rP (K
On |f,KOn−1, ROn−2 , . . . , R) ≤ rP (KOn |s, FOn−1, ROn−2 , . . . , R).
In the first case On weakly prefers to keep the Agent for all (a, ω), while in the second On weakly
prefers to fire the Agent for all (a, ω). By Lemma 5.2 this implies that On does not investigate.
So far we have established that for On to investigate it must be the case that
rP (K
On |s,KOn−1, ROn−2 , . . . , R) 6= rP (KOn |s, FOn−1, ROn−2 , . . . , R).
By a similar argument we also have
rP (K
On |f,KOn−1, ROn−2 , . . . , R) 6= rP (KOn |f, FOn−1, ROn−2 , . . . , R).
Moreover, for On to investigate it must be the case that if
rP (K
On |s,KOn−1, ROn−2 , . . . , R) > rP (KOn |s, FOn−1, ROn−2 , . . . , R)
then
rP (K
On |f,KOn−1, ROn−2 , . . . , R) < rP (KOn |f, FOn−1, ROn−2 , . . . , R),
and vice versa, as otherwise, by Lemma 5.2, On does not investigate. Recalling that we restrict
attention to pure strategies establishes the result.
Proposition 9.2 Suppose there is a hierarchy of n Overseers, n ≥ 2, with e∅i = 0 for all i.
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(i) If aωH > 1/2, and aωL < 1/2, then there exist WA,WOi, such that, if WA ≥ WA and, for
all i, WOi ≥ WOi, then there exists an equilibrium in which each Overseer Oi investigates
only upon observing the sequence of retention decisions (KOi−2 , . . . ,KO1 ,K) and the Agent
chooses aˆ(ω) = a for all ω.
(ii) If aωH > 1/2, and aωL < 1/2, then there exist WA,WOi, such that, if WA ≥ WA and, for
all i, WOi ≥ WOi, then there exists an equilibrium in which each Overseer Oi investigates
only upon observing the sequence of retention decisions (KOi−2 , . . . ,KO1 ,K) and the Agent
chooses aˆ(ω) =

a if ω = ωH
a otherwise .
(iii) If aωL > 1/2, and aωH < 1/2, then there exist WA,WOi, such that, if WA ≥ WA and, for
all i, WOi ≥ WOi, then there exists an equilibrium in which each Overseer Oi investigates
only upon observing the sequence of retention decisions (KOi−2 , . . . ,KO1 ,K) and the Agent
chooses aˆ(ω) =

a if ω = ωH
a otherwise .
The following wage levels WA,WOi are the lowest wages for which, in equilibrium, the Agent exerts
high effort in both states of the world, and the Overseers investigate. Similar expressions hold for
equilibria of type (ii) and (iii).
For all n ≥ 2, WA = k(a− a)/e1.
If n = 2, we have WO1 = c1/e1e2pi, and WO2 = c2/e1e2pi(2aˆ(ωH)ωH − 1) whenever pi ≤ pˆi :=
1−2aˆ(ωL)ωL
2(aˆ(ωH)ωH−aˆ(ωL)ωL) and WO1 = c1/e1e2(1−pi), and WO2 = c2/e1e2(1−pi)(1− 2aˆ(ωL)ωL) whenever
pi > pˆi.
For all n ≥ 3, we have WO1 = c1/e1e2. Moreover, WOn = cn/enpi(2aˆ(ωH)ωH − 1) whenever
pi ≤ pˆi, and WOn = cn/enpi(1− 2aˆ(ωL)ωL) whenever pi > pˆi.
If n = 3, then WO2 = c2/e1e2e3pi, whenever pi ≤ pˆi, and WO2 = c2/e1e2e3(1 − pi), whenever
pi > pˆi.
Finally, if n ≥ 4, then WO2 = c2/e1e2e3, and WOi = ci/eiei+1 for all 3 ≤ i ≤ n− 2. Moreover,
WOn−1 = cn−1/en−1enpi, whenever pi ≤ pˆi, and WOn−1 = cn−1/en−1en(1− pi), whenever pi > pˆi.
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Proof of Proposition 9.2. In what follows we prove the statement for the case in which
the Agent chooses aˆ(ω) = a for all ω. The proof of the other cases follows the same steps with
straightforward adjustments. Let there be n Overseers and consider the following strategy profile:














(iv) O2 investigates both upon observing that O1 kept the Agent and upon observing that O1
fired the Agent, i.e. I2(K) = I2(F ) = 1.
(v) Oi, i ≥ 3, investigates upon observing that all the Overseers Oj<i, j ≥ 2, kept their subordi-
nate Overseer and does not investigate otherwise. In particular, Ii(K
Oi−2 ,KOi−3 , . . . ,K) =
Ii(K
Oi−2 ,KOi−3 , . . . , F ) = 1.
(vi) For all Oi, n ≥ i ≥ 2, Oi fires Oi−1 if Oi does not observe (a, ω). Moreover, whenever
Oi observes (a, ω), Oi’s decision to keep or fire Oi−1 is not conditioned on the sequence of
retention decisions, i.e. for all (a, ω) and for all (ROi−2 , . . . , R), (R
Oi−2
′ , . . . , R′), we have
rOi(K
Oi−1 |a, ω,ROi−2 , . . . , R) = rOi(KOi−1 |a, ω,ROi−2′ , . . . , R′).
(vii) For all Oi, n− 1 ≥ i ≥ 2, and for all ω, Oi keeps Oi−1 whenever Oi observes (a, ω).
(viii) If pi ≤ pˆi then On keeps On−1 if On observes (a, ωH), and fires On−1 if On observes (a, ωL).
If pi > pˆi then On keeps On−1 if On observes (a, ωL), and fires On−1 if On observes (a, ωH).
(ix) If pi ≤ pˆi, then for all sequences of retention decisions (ROn−2 , . . . , R) we have
rP (K
On |s,KOn−1 , ROn−2 , . . . , R) = 1,
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rP (K
On |s, FOn−1 , ROn−2 , . . . , R) = 0,
rP (K
On |f,KOn−1 , ROn−2 , . . . , R) = 0,
and
rP (K
On |f, FOn−1 , ROn−2 , . . . , R) = 1.
If pi > pˆi, then for all sequences of retention decisions (ROn−2 , . . . , R) we have
rP (K
On |s,KOn−1 , ROn−2 , . . . , R) = 0,
rP (K
On |s, FOn−1 , ROn−2 , . . . , R) = 1,
rP (K
On |f,KOn−1 , ROn−2 , . . . , R) = 1,
and
rP (K
On |f, FOn−1 , ROn−2 , . . . , R) = 0.
In what follows we show that the so defined strategy profile is an equilibrium, provided WA ≥WA,
and, for all i, WOi ≥ WOi . We do so in the case where pi ≤ pˆi. Derivations for pi > pˆi follow the
same steps with straightforward adjustments.
(i) A has no incentive to deviate. Indeed, we have
UA(a, I1, rO1 |ω) = k(1− a) + e1WA + (1− e1)WA ≥ k(1− a) + (1− e1)WA = UA(a, I1, rO1 |ω),
for all ω given that WA ≥ WA := k(a − a)/e1. Hence, A has no incentive to deviate if
WA ≥WA.
(ii) O1 investigates. As O2 fires O1 whenever O2 does not observe (a, ω), and as O2 cannot
observe (a, ω) unless O1 does so as well, O1 receives a payoff of 0, whenever he chooses not
to investigate, i.e., we have UO1(I1 = 0, I2, rO2) = 0. If n = 2, O1 gets retained if, and only
if, O2 observes (a, ωH). As aˆ(ωH) = a, and I2(K) = I2(F ) = 1 this occurs with probability
e1e2pi whenever O1 investigates. It follows that UO1(I1 = 1, I2, rO2) = e1e2piWO1 − c1. Hence,
when there are two Overseers, O1 investigates as long as WO1 ≥ WO1 := c1/e1e2pi. If n > 2,
O1 gets retained when O2 observes (a, ωH) and when O2 observes (a, ωL), but not otherwise.
Again, aˆ(ω) = a for all ω, and I2(K) = I2(F ) = 1 then imply that UO1(I1 = 1, I2, rO2) =
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e1e2WO1 − c1. Hence, if there are more than two Overseers, O1 investigates as long as WO1 ≥
WO1 := c1/e1e2.
(iii) Note that O2 investigates both when O1 keeps the Agent and when O1 fires the Agent.
Moreover, O2 does not condition his retention decision of O1 on O1’s own retention decision
of the Agent. It follows that O1 is always indifferent between keeping and firing the Agent.
Hence, any retention rule used by O1 is a best-response.
(iv) We now show that O2 investigates both upon observing that O1 kept the Agent and upon
observing that O1 fired the Agent. Suppose first that there are two Overseers, n = 2. If O2
does not investigate upon observing that O1 kept the Agent, then O2 does not observe (a, ω)
and chooses to fire O1. Given that the Principal fires O2 unless, either there is policy success
and O2 kept O1, or there is policy failure and O2 fired O1, we have
UO2(I2(K) = 0, rP ) = pi(1− aωH)WO2 + (1− pi)(1− aωL)WO2 .
If O2 chooses to investigate, however, then with probability e2e1pi, O2 observes (a, ωH) and
decides to keep O1. In all other cases, O2 chooses to fire O1. It follows that
UO2(I2(K) = 1, rP ) = e2e1piaωHWO2+e2e1(1−pi)(1−aωL)WO2+(1−e2e1)UO2(I2(K) = 0, rP )−c2.
Rearranging, we find that UO2(I2(K) = 1, rP ) ≥ UO2(I2(K) = 0, rP ) if, and only if, WO2 ≥
WO2 := c2/e1e2pi(2aωH − 1).
Suppose next that there are three Overseers, n = 3. Note that, on the equilibrium path, O2
only gets retained if O3 observes (a, ωH). As O3 cannot observe (a, ω), when O2 does not
either, we have
UO2(I2(K) = 0, I3, r3) = 0.
Moreover, on the equilibrium path, O1 always keeps the Agent. Hence, O2 does not learn
anything about whether O1 observed (a, ω) or not upon observing that O1 kept the Agent.
Hence, when O2 chooses to investigate the probability that O2 observes (a, ω) is e1e2. As O3
only keeps O2 upon observing (a, ωH) the probability that O2 is retained when investigating
is e1e2e3pi. We thus have
UO2(I2(K) = 1, I3, r3) = e1e2e3piWO2 − c2.
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It follows that O2 investigates in the three Overseers case if, and only if, WO2 ≥ WO2 :=
c2/e1e2e3pi.
Suppose finally that there are n ≥ 4 Overseers. As in the three Overseers case we have
UO2(I2(K) = 0, I3, r3) = 0. Unlike in the three Overseers case, however, O3 now keeps O2
both upon observing (a, ωH) and upon observing (a, ωL). Hence, UO2(I2(K) = 1, I3, r3) =
e1e2e3WO2 − c2, and thus O2 investigates in the n ≥ 4 Overseers case if, and only if, WO2 ≥
WO2 := c2/e1e2e3.
In all the cases, O1 firing the Agent is off-the-equilibrium path. Hence, we can let I2(F ) = 1.
(v) As every Overseer Oj 6=i, 3 ≤ j ≤ n, keeps Oj−1 upon observing (aˆ(ω), ω) and fires Oj−1 upon
not observing (a, ω), Oi can infer from Ol<i firing Ol−1, that Ol did no observe (a, ω). Hence,
if Oi chooses to investigate, Oi will not learn (a, ω) either. Now suppose i ≤ n − 1, then Oi
also knows that Oi+1 will not observe (a, ω) and will thus fire Oi. It follows
UOi(Ii(R
Oi−2 , . . . , FOj−1 , . . . , R) = 1, Ii+1, ri+1) = −ci
< 0 = UOi(Ii(R
Oi−2 , . . . , FOj−1 , . . . , R) = 0, Ii+1, ri+1)
and Oi chooses not to investigate upon observing that some Overseer Ol<i did not retain his
subordinate Overseer. If i = n, then On chooses to fire On−1 upon not observing (a, ω) and
will thus only be retained by the Principal when there is policy failure. We thus have
UOn(In(R
Oi−2 , . . . , FOj−1 , . . . , R) = 1, rP ) = pi(1− aωH)WOn + (1− pi)(1− aωL)WOn − ci
< pi(1− aωH)WOn + (1− pi)(1− aωL)WOn
= UOn(In(R
On−2 , . . . , FOj−1 , . . . , R) = 0, rP )
Suppose now that the Overseer Oi, 3 ≤ i ≤ n−1, observes the sequence of retention decisions
(KOi−2 ,KOi−3 , . . . ,K). As every Overseer Oj keeps Oj−1 upon observing (aˆ(ω), ω) and fires
Oj−1 upon not observing (a, ω), Oi can infer from (KOi−2 ,KOi−3 , . . . ,K) that every Overseer
below him in the hierarchy has observed (aˆ(ω), ω). Hence, if Oi chooses to investigate, Oi will
learn (aˆ(ω), ω) with probability ei. Moreover, if Oi observes (aˆ(ω), ω), Oi will keep Oi−1. In
equilibrium Oi+1 will then choose to investigate himself and keep Oi upon observing (aˆ(ω), ω).
It follows that UOi(Ii(K
Oi−2 ,KOi−1 , . . . ,K) = 1, Ii+1, ri+1) = eiei+1WOi − ci. If Oi does not
investigate, however, Oi will not learn (a, ω). Thus Oi+1 will not learn (a, ω) either and will
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fire Oi. Hence, UOi(Ii(K
Oi−2 ,KOi−1 , . . . ,K) = 0, Ii+1, ri+1) = 0. It follows that Oi chooses
to investigate upon observing (KOi−2,KOi−3 , . . . ,K) as long as WOi ≥WOi := ci/eiei+1.
Finally, as before, we have
UOn(In(K
On−2 ,KOn−3 , . . . ,K) = 0, rP ) = pi(1− aωH)WOn + (1− pi)(1− aωL)WOn .
Upon observing the sequence of retention decisions (KOi−2 ,KOi−3 , . . . ,K), On knows that
every Overseer below him in the hierarchy has observed (aˆ(ω), ω). Hence, if On chooses to
investigate he will observe (aˆ(ω), ω) with probability en. As On keeps On−1 upon observing
(a, ωH) and fires On−1 otherwise and given the Principal fires O2 unless, either there is policy
success and O2 kept O1, or there is policy failure and O2 fired O1, we have
UOn(In(K
On−2 ,KOn−3 , . . . ,K) = 1, rP ) = enpiaωHWOn + en(1− pi)(1− aωL)WOn
+ (1− en)UOn(In(KOn−2 ,KOn−3 , . . . ,K) = 0, rP )− cn.
Rearranging, we find that
UOn(In(K
On−2 ,KOn−3 , . . . ,K) = 1, rP ) ≥ UO2(In(KOn−2 ,KOn−3 , . . . ,K) = 0, rP )
if, and only if, WOn ≥WOn := cn/enpi(2aωH − 1).
(vi) Suppose that Oi, n > i ≥ 2, does not observe (a, ω). Whether Oi keeps or fires Oi−1, Oi+1
will not observe (a, ω) either and will thus fire Oi. Hence, we have UOi(K
Oi−1 |∅, ∅, ·, . . . , ·) =
UOi(F
Oi−1 |∅, ∅, ·, . . . , ·) = 0. Hence, it is a best-response for Oi to fire Oi−1 upon not observing
(a, ω). Now suppose On does not observe (a, ω). If On keeps On−1, On gets retained only if
there is policy success. If On fires On−1, On only gets retained if there is policy failure. Hence,
as pi ≤ pˆi, we have
UOn(K
On−1 |∅, ∅, ·, . . . , ·, ROn−2 , . . . , R) = piaωHWOn + (1− pi)aωLWOn
≤ pi(1− aωH)WOn + (1− pi)(1− aωL)WOn
= UOn(F
On−1 |∅, ∅, ·, . . . , ·, ROn−2 , . . . , R).
Finally, note that the Principal does not condition his retention decision on (ROn−2 , . . . , R).
It follows that for all (a, ω), and for all (ROn−2 , . . . , R), (R
On−2
′ , . . . , R′), we have
UOn(R
On−1 |a, ω,ROn−2 , . . . , R) = UOn(ROn−1 |a, ω,ROn−2′ , . . . , R′).
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Hence, On has no incentive to condition his retention decision of On−1 on (ROn−2 , . . . , R).
Repeating the argument we find that there is no Oi, i ≥ 2, who has an incentive to condition
his retention decision on (ROi−2 , . . . , R).
(vii) As Oi+1 chooses not to investigate upon observing that Oi fired Oi−1 and thus subsequently
fires Oi, we have UOi(F
Oi−1 |a, ω,ROi−2 , . . . , R) = 0, for all n−1 ≥ i ≥ 2, and for all sequences
of retention decisions (ROi−2 , . . . , R). Suppose now the sequence of retention decisions is
(KOi−2 , . . . ,K) and Oi, n − 1 ≥ i ≥ 2, observes (a, ω). Then, as Oi+1 investigates upon
observing (KOi−1 , . . . ,K) and keeps Oi if Oi+1 observes (a, ω), we have
UOi(K
Oi−1 |a, ω,KOi+2 , . . . ,K) = ei+1WOi .
It follows thatOi keepsOi−1 upon observing the sequence of retention decisions (KOi−1 , . . . ,K)
and (a, ω).
Suppose now the sequence of retention decisions is not (KOi−2 , . . . ,K), yet Oi, n− 1 ≥ i ≥ 2,
observes (a, ω), which can only happen off-the-equilibrium path. Whether Oi fires or keeps
Oi−1, Oi+1 will not investigate and will thus subsequently fire Oi. It follows that Oi is then
indifferent between keeping and firing Oi−1. Keeping Oi−1 in this case is thus a best-response.
(viii) Given rP , we have
UOn(K
On−1 , rP |a, ωH , In−1, . . . , I1,KOn−2 , . . . ,K) = aωHWOn
> (1− aωH)WOn
= UOn(F
On−1 , rP |a, ωH , In−1, . . . , I1,KOn−2 , . . . ,K),
if, and only if, aωH > 1/2. Similarly,
UOn(K
On−1 , rP |a, ωL, In−1, . . . , I1,KOn−2 , . . . ,K) = aωLWOn
< (1− aωL)WOn
= UOn(F
On−1 , rP |a, ωL, In−1, . . . , I1,KOn−2 , . . . ,K),
if, and only if, aωL < 1/2.
(ix) As this is a moral hazard game, the Principal is always indifferent between keeping and firing
On and rP is indeed a best-response.
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10 Robustness checks A: Outcome Stochastically Revealed to Over-
seers
So far, we made the stark assumption that only the Principal observes the policy outcome. We now
relax this assumption by considering the case in which the outcome is revealed stochastically to
the Overseers. Specifically, we assume that, conditional on the outcome not having been revealed
so far, Overseer Oi learns the outcome with probability qi before deciding whether to investigate.
Once the outcome is revealed to some Overseer, it is revealed to all the actors of the game. Maybe
surprisingly, we show that the attractiveness of the hierarchy to the Principal is not necessarily
improved and may even diminish when Overseers are likely to observe the policy outcome. The
main reason is that, as in the model of section 4.2 Overseers do not investigate once the outcome
is revealed.
Lemma 10.1 For all i = 1, 2, Oi does not investigate if Oi observes the outcome before deciding
whether to investigate.
Proof. Almost identical to argument given in proof of proposition 4.1
As long as q1, q2 < 1, it is still possible to have an equilibrium in which the Agent chooses to
exert high effort in both states of the world and the Overseers investigate upon not observing the
outcome. In such an equilibrium, each Overseer keeps his subordinate when there is success and
fires him when there is failure. When the outcome is not revealed, the Overseers essentially adopt
the same behavior as in the equilibrium that sustains proposition 5.5. In particular, Overseer O2
fires Overseer O1 when O2 does not observe (a, ω) and keeps O1 upon observing (a, ω) at least for
some ω.
Proposition 10.1 Suppose there is a hierarchy of two Overseers. Suppose further, that, condi-
tionally on the outcome not having been revealed so far, each Overseer observes the policy outcome
with probability qi before deciding whether to investigate.
(i) If aωH ≤ 1/2, or if aωL ≥ 1/2, then no Overseer ever investigates in equilibrium, and the
Agent chooses aˆ(ω) = a if, and only if, WA ≥ k/q1ωL.
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(ii) If aωH > 1/2, and aωL < 1/2, then there exist WA,WOi, such that, if WA ≥ WA and, for
all i, WOi ≥ WOi, then there exists an equilibrium in which each Overseer Oi investigates
only upon not observing the outcome and observing the sequence of retention decisions K
and the Agent chooses aˆ(ω) = a for all ω. In the cheapest such equilibrium, we have WA =
k(a−a)
q1(a−a)ωL+(1−q1)e1 . Moreover, WO1 is increasing in q2.
Compared to an environment, where Overseers do not observe the outcome, the main difference
is that, as Overseers do not condition on the retention decision of their subordinate when the
outcome is revealed, the incentives for Overseer O1 to investigate arise entirely through the retention
rule used by O2 when the policy outcome is not revealed. It follows that the incentives for O1 to
investigate are reduced the more likely Overseer O2 is to observe the outcome before deciding
whether to investigate or not which explains that WO1 is increasing in q2. Moreover, when the
probability that the first Overseer observes (a, ω) upon investigating is sufficiently high that k(a−
a)/e1 < k/ωL, then WA is increasing in q1 as well. It follows that there are ranges of values for
a, a, ωL, ωH , e1, such that, given a vector of wages (WA,WO1 ,WO2), the Agent would exert high
effort in both states of the world when the Overseers are certain not to observe the outcome before
deciding whether to investigate, but would revert to exerting low effort when each Overseer Oi
observes the outcome with conditional probability qi > 0.
This stands in sharp contrast to results one obtains when Overseers costlessly observe a and
ω. To see this, consider a generalization of the model of section 4.2 and suppose that there is a
single Overseer who observes (a, ω) with probability e1, and the policy outcome with probability q1.
Assume further that whether the Overseer observes (a, ω) does not depend on whether he observes
the policy outcome.
Proposition 10.2 Suppose a single Overseer who observes (a, ω) with probability e1 and observes
the policy outcome with probability q1. Then, in equilibrium, the Agent chooses
aˆ(ω) =




Upon observing (a, ω), the Overseer retains the Agent if and only if a ≥ a. Upon not observing
(a, ω), the Overseer retains the Agent when there is policy success and fires the Agent when there
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is failure. The Principal can guarantee these choices by retaining the Overseer if and only if the
outcome is success.
Proof. Suppose the Principal keeps the Overseer when the policy outcome is success and fires the
Overseer when the policy outcome is failure, independently of the retention decision of the Overseer,
i.e. rP (K
O|s,K) = rP (KO|s, F ) = 1 and rP (KO|f,K) = rP (KO|f, F ) = 0. Then, the Overseer is
always indifferent between keeping and firing the Agent. Moreover, the utility of the Overseer is
strictly increasing in the probability of success and hence in the level of effort exerted by the Agent.
It follows that the Overseer wants to choose the retention rule that gives the Agent the strongest
incentives to choose a over a. Hence, it is optimal for the Overseer to keep the Agent if he observes
that the Agent exerted a and to fire the Agent if he observes a. Moreover, as success is more likely
when the Agent exerts high effort, the Overseer should interpret policy success as an indication
that the Overseer exerted high effort, and policy failure as an indication that the Agent exerted low
effort. In order to provide the strongest incentives to choose a, the Overseer, upon not observing
(a, ω), should thus retain A when he observes policy success and fire when he observes policy failure.
It follows that UA(a|ω) = k(1− a) + e1WA + (1− e1)q1aωWA + (1− e1)(1− q1)rO1(K|∅, ∅)WA and
UA(a|) = k(1 − a) + (1 − e1)q1aωWA + (1 − e1)(1 − q1)rO1(K|∅, ∅)WA. Thus, A chooses a if, and
only if, WA ≥ k(a−a)e1+(1−e1)q1(a−a)ω .
In such a setting WA is decreasing in the probability e1 that the first Overseer observes (a, ω)
and in the probability q1 that the Overseer observes the policy outcome. In other words, the more
likely the Overseer is to observe the policy outcome the better he is able to incentivize the Agent
to exert high effort.
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